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INTRODUCTION
The Southwestern region of the United States is
undergoing rapid growth and transformation from a
mostly rural, agriculturally based region into one
which is becoming more urbanized and dependent on
manufacturing, industry and energy development.
Because of its arid environment, this region has been
heavily dependent or* the waters of the Colorado River
Basin to sustain its domestic and agricultural needs
and to promote the new enter g i ng land uses. The
combination of rapid growth and new land use activities
has substantially increased the competition for scarce
water resources, creating a "water management crisis"
which is affecting both the region and the nation.
Historically, increased agricultural and mineral
development and the expanding demand for water beyond
the confines of river valleys, required the development
of water projects to facilitate diversion of water from
its source, to the place of need. In add it ion, the
need t o prot ect water rights d ur i ng t i mes o f scare i t
y
was recognized, as a result of the often undependable
flows associated with arid river basins.
A system of legal institutions was devised, during
the ey^a of cheap and abundant water, to facilitate the
process of water deve 1 oprnent and d i vers ion, and to
identify and protect the water rights of those who put
the water to beneficial use. However, these
institutions did not specifically address the problem
of reallocating or transfering water and water rights
to new ar\d compet ing uses, once al 1 the water had been
developed in a part icular area (Kneese and Brown 1981
;
Castle 1381?).
During times of relative water abundance it has
been economically and politically less costly to
develop new sources of water, as opposed to attempting
the difficult decision of allocating water between
COMpet ing uses (Kneese and Brown 1981 ) . However, it is
now recognized that water resources in the Colorado
River Basin are almost fully developed, and are over
appropriated, if not yet fully utilized. There will
not be enough water to meet all of the demands, both
within and around the basin (Lamm 1977; Kneese and
Brown 1981).
fis a result, water resource planning in the
southwestern United States is undergoing a major
transition from the development phase to the management
phase. Many experts agree (Lamm 1977; Anderson 1983;
Kneese and Brown 1981 ) that the emphasis of water
institutions must change from development, diversion
and storage of new water sources, to the management,
allocation and transfer of existing resources from old
uses to new hi gher val ued uses. In add it ion,
increasing competition over scarce water resources and
the emerging "water management crisis" will require
changes in existing institut ions to fac i 1 it at
e
transfers " under social ly acceptable pract ices that
balance the need for economically efficient use with
societal norms of fairness and equity" (Kneese and
Brown 1961, 94).
This Masters Report examines issues surrounding
water rights and water al locat ion in the Colorado River
Basin, as well as the existing legal institutions and
how they are changing to meet new demands on the
basin's water resources.
Chapter One examines the significance of the
Colorado River Basin to the Southwest region and the
nation, and reviews some of the management issues and
controversies surrounding the al locat ion of its water.
Chapter Two examines the exist ing legal inst itut ions
controlling the ownership and allocation of the basin's
water, concentrating on the appropriation doctrine and
the interstate compact. Included is a review of some
of the case law involved with the development and
interpret at ion of these inst itut ions. Chapter Three
discusses some of the problems, recommendations and
emerging trends in these institutions, and discusses
their implications on future water planning and
management in the Colorado River Basin.
Chapter 1
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN: WATER
MANAGEMENT AND RELATED ISSUES
The Colorado River Basin is comprised of parts of
seven western states: Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New
Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and California, and part of
Mexico. It is divided into the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin at Lee Ferry in northern Arizona (see Figure 1).
Draining one twelfth of the United States, £42,008
square miles, it is the largest arid ris^er basin in the
country. However, it "produces the lowest outflow per
unit area (60 acre-feet per square mile) of any river
basin in the United States" (Kneese and Brown 1981, 44)
(see Figure S) - In addition, this basin exports more
water than any other, almost one—third of its virgin
flow. Intense competition over this water has resulted
in the most regulated, politicized, over-utilized and
litigated river in the world (National Research Council
1966, £-17; Plummer 1983, 3). It is so thoroughly
ut i 1 ized by the arid Southwest region that "except for
occasional local flood flows, no water has reached the
Gulf of California ... in the last twenty years"
(Fradkin 1961, 16)
.
FIGURE 1. THE UPPER AND LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
Source: U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment (1980, 38).
FIGURE 2. POTENTIAL SURFACE-WATER RESOURCES
Source: National Research Council (1968, 6),
Numerous controversies involving the Basin and the
allocation of its waters have permeated the economic,
social, political, environmental and legal aspects of
daily life in the southwestern United States, and
increasingly affect the nation. A number of issues
have come together to focus national attention on the
signficance of this region and its water management.
Political Influence
Although the seven basin states have often been at
odds with each other over the allocation of the basin's
water, they have been able to unify themselves as a
powerful political force within Congress on matters
concerning western land and water resources. Fradkin
describes the extent of the political power of the
seven basin states and their Committee of Fourteen,
through which they served as advisors to the State
Department and the Department of Interior during
negotiations with Mexico in 1945 and 1973 concerning
the quantity and quality of water which would be
allocated to Mexico. fis a result of their political
influence the basin states were successful in shifting
the obligation for supplying Mexico's 1.5 million
acre-feet per year allocation to a national obligation.
This meant the basin states were no longer solely
responsible for supplying the water, or paying for the
expensive desalination projects needed to meet treaty
obligations (Fradkin 1981, £99-318).
Since their unification under the Colorado River
Compact of 19£2, the Colorado Basin states have
controlled the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, as well as other Congressional subcommittees
which deal with western lands and water projects
(Ingram 1978, 64). Under the leadership of Wayne
. Aspinall, and later Morris Udall, these western states
have been successful in getting Congressional approval
of massive water acts and appropriations which have
often been controversial, but which remained relatively
untouchable until President Carter's "war on Hater
projects" in 1977 (Fradkin 1981, 3-110).
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The most significant water project acts which have
gained approval include: the Boulder Canyon Project Act
of 1928 which included major Lower Basin projects such
as Hoover Dam and the All American Canal; the Colorado
River Storage Project Act of 1356 which included Blen
Canyon Dam and three other Upper Basin storage
projects; and the Colorado River Basin Project Act of
1968 which included the massive Central Arizona Project
in the Lower Basin, as well as additional Upper Basin
projects (Boslin 1978, 33-50). The locations of these
projects at^e shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. WATER PROJECTS AND PUBLIC LANDS
Source: Fradkin (1981, 1).
The complexities and expense of these water
projects, as well as the need for economies of scale,
has required the leadership of the federal government
for planning, funding and construct ion. The major
controversies surrounding these large water projects
have centered on the inequities and limitations of
distributive politics and the use of benefit-cost
analysis to justify which projects were approved.
Critics cite the inability of benefit-cost analysis to
adequately account for often less quantifiable public
values, benefits and costs. They assert that
benefit-cost analysis has limited application in
allocation of scarce water between competing uses, and
that it should be used in conjunction with more
comprehensive planning techniques (Bromley 1980, £7-£8
;
Chan 1981, 85-107). "It is true that BCA Cbenef it-cost
analysis] was useful in separat ing the clearly inferior
proj ect s from t hose t h at were more reasona ble, but its
primary role has been one of legitimating political
decisions" (Bromley 1980, £31).
These large water projects have been characterized
as omnibus porkbarrel "raids on the national treasury"
which benefit a local region, but ar^e often not in the
nat ional interest and do not reflect true costs ( Ingram
1978, 6E:) . Ingram describes how distributive politics
has also discouraged state and local planning by
8limiting the i n format ion and range of choice on which
water resource decisions are made so that projects
would fit federa 1 criteria. The resu It has been
piecemeal planning and uncoordinated projects which are
insensitive to environmental concerns or the needs of
the basin. She suggests that comprehensive basin—wide
pi anning is more effect i ve for protecting the interest s
arid needs of the basin. The emergence of the
environmental movement, more regulatory decisionmaking,
e.g. National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, and
federal decentralisation appear to signal a shift to a
political climate which will encourage increased state
i nvo 1 vement i n water resource p 1 ann ing (1 978, 6£-74 >
.
One of the most important factors affecting the
water management crisis are the institutions related to
different aspects of planning land and water resource
use. The Reagan fidrninistrat ion has init iated a pol icy
of federal decent ral izat ion. For planning and natural
resource management this means that much of the
technical assistance and pol icy decisions previously
provided at the federal level will become the
responsi bi 1 ity of state and local agencies. Because
most states and regions have become dependant on
federal assistance of all kinds, this transition will
require organ i sat ional, technical and administrat i ve
devitalization of their planning and management
systems.
Federal v. State Management
The seven basin states, along with other western
states, sre continuing their historical rivalry with
the federal government's land acts. Approximately 7iZi
percent of the Colorado River Basin is owned or
administered by the federal government in the form of
Indian reservations, national parks and forests,
military reservations and other holdings (see Table 1),
The emergence of the "Sagebrush Rebellion" is an
attempt by these states to gain control of federal
lands within their borders and establish
self-determination over the use of their resources. •='
TABLE 1 LAND OWNERSHIP IN STATES OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
AS A PERCENT OF THE TOTAL AREA OF EACH STATE
State Private Indian State Federal FS BLM NPS FWS
Ariz. 28.7 27.2 13.2 44.1 15.5 17.3 2.6 2.1
Calif. 51.9 0.6 06 47 5 20 3 16.6 4.5 —
Colo. 61 6 1.1 45 37.3 21 6 12.0 0.8 —
Nev 106 1.7 — 87.7 7.3 69 9 0.4 3.1
N. Mex 57 6 9.2 11.9 33.2 11 9 165 0.3 04
Utah 32.1 4.3 6.9 63.6 15.3 41 9 1.6 02
Wyo. 48 4 3.0 59 486 14.8 28 5 38 —
Mean 41.6 6.7 6.1 51 7 15.2 29.0 2.0 08
Sources of data; Bureau of Land Management (1978) and Patnc (1981). FS = Forest Service.
BLM = Bureau of Land Management. NPS = National Park Service. FWS = Fish and Wildlife
Service. Federal' column is for all federal lands and exceeds the sums of
FS + BLM + NPS + FWS because of other unspecified federal holdings, mostly military.
Source: Graf (1985, 7).
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Central to this issue is the legal question
concerning quantification of federal and Indian water
rights on the large percentage of federal and Indian
lands which comprise western states. Ruling on the
case of Winters v. United States . £07 U.S. 564 (1908),
the U.S. Supreme Court found the establishment of
Indian reservations by treaty, or statute also implied
the withdrawal of a sufficient amount of unappropriated
water to satisfy the purposes and needs of the
reservation (Simms 1980, 69). The date of the
reservation, or treaty established the priority date of
the water right with respect to other rights. At issue
is the interpretation of what purposes these
reservations include. Are Indian water rights limited
to historically agricultural uses, or do they include
other potential purposes such as energy development?
The federal government asserts similar implied
"federal reserved rights" on its public domain lands.
These implied federal and Indian water rights are in
direct conflict with the established state laws of
prior appropriation (Kneese and Brown 1981, 70). In
addition, the early dates of these reserved rights
makes them senior, or of a higher priority than most
other rights in the basin. When these rights are
quantified there could be major shifts in allocation
away from established water users, such as mining and
11
agriculture, resulting in increased tension between
competing water users, as well as intensifying the
dispute between federal or state control over land and
water resources.
The Energy Crisis
More than any other issue, the 1973 OPEC oil
embargo and the continuing world—wide energy crisis may
have focused national attention on the Colorado River
Easin. Recognizing our vulnerability to political and
economic incidents in the international energy market,
the United States has established a national energy
policy aimed at energy independence. Implementation of
this policy will require development of the vast coal,
oil shale, tar sand and uranium deposits which are
located in and around the basin, some of which are the
largest remaining reserves in the nation. This energy
development can not be accomplished without utilizing
water resources.
Virtually all energy technologies dealing with
fossil, mineral and synthetic fuels require large
amounts of water during some phase of extraction,
transportation, conversion, production, cooling, waste
disposal, or land reclamation. It is certain that any
development of these energy resources in the Colorado
12
River Basin will conflict with other water dependent
activities such as agriculture which accounts for as
much as 90 percent of the basin's water consumption.
One of the major factors affecting how quickly and to
what extent these energy resources will be developed,
other than energy prices, is the availability of
sufficient quantities of water. Mineral energy
development will also adversely affect water quality in
the basin due to surface runoff, waste water, and
various salts and heavy metal pollutants. While
treatment technologies exist for some energy processes,
they have not been perfected for more complicated
processes, such as those found in oil shale production
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1981, 1-18).
Sunbelt Migration
The Colorado River Basin and Southwest region have
gained national attention as a result of sunbelt
migration caused by the influx of high-technology
industries and energy companies, in addition to other
factors such as the increased importance of amenity
resources. The arid regions both surrounding and
within the Basin have shown high growth rates as people
and industries migrate out of the frostbelt and into
the sunbelt states.
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R 1986 U.S. Census report indicates that the
western United States has grown at a rate of 10.8
percent since 1980, twice the national average. fill of
the Colorado River Basin states, except Wyoming, were
amoung the ten fastest growing states in the country:
Arizona 17. £ %, Nevada 16.9 %, Utah 1£. 6 54, Colorado
11.8 Y-, California 11.4 %, and New Mexico 11.3 %
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986, £) .
This massive migration, linked with the
accompanying urban and economic growth has placed
additional strain on government agencies which must
deal with growth problems and other planning issues, in
addition to allocation of scarce water resources. This
growth has often occured in rural areas which lack
adequate planning organizations, or administrative
procedures to handle the impact on rural or
environmentally sensitive areas. The impact of this
growth on the Basin's water resources has been
magnified by large water exports to areas outside the
basin in southern California and parts of Arizona, Utah
and Colorado to support industry, agriculture and large
urban growth centers (Los fingeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake
City and Denver).
14
Balancing Development and Preservation
This rapid growth raises the fundamental issue
facing land and water planning in the Southwest
:
balancing development with preservat ion of the
environmental and cultural character of the region
(Vlachos and Hendricks 1377, 3) . Except for the large
urban centers surrounding the Colorado River Basin,
this region is characterized as a rural, resource rich,
poverty stricken area which has been called the
"Southwest Poverty Diagonal" (see Figure A) (Kneese and
Brown 1 98 1 , B ) . As a resu 1 1 , t here are st rong
pressures for development of the region's vast
resources t o create econorn i c growt h , ra i se i ncome
levels and reduce the energy crisis. This must be
balanced with the conf 1 ict ing goal of preserving the
recreational and amenity resources of a region
containing large undeveloped open spaces and a great
number of national parks, monuments and national
forests which have a high value to the nat ion in their
undeveloped state.
Pt stake is the totality of the western character,
of values contained in the associated natural
environments, and of the images of the western
front er concerning open spaces. (Vlachos and
Hendricks 1977, 3)
15
FIGURE 4. THE SOUTHWEST POVERTY DIAGONAL
Source: Kneese and Brown (1981, 9).
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The Co 1 orado R i ver Bas i n must serve the wat er
needs of approximately £0 million people throughout the
Southwest and Mexico. A long history of heavy water
use has resulted in the ovei—appropriat ion of water
rights, making water a major 1 i miting factor for most
land use act ivit ies. This has caused increased
cornpet it ion between municipal, agricultural , industrial
and energy interests, which are most ly of f-stream water
uses. 3 Inst ream uses for fish and wi ldl ife,
recreation, power generation and minimum stream flows
are also facing increased cornpet ion.
For water resource management, the issue becomes
allocation between and arnoung these various uses T and
transfers of water from old uses to new higher valued
uses. Most water transfers will come from agriculture,
which is the largest water user in the basin. As
competition over water increases it may be cheaper and
much quicker for energy companies and other large
consumers to buyout agricultural rights instead of
waiting for state and federal governments to build new
storage projects. Agricultural rights valued at
$£0. 00/acre—foot can not compete with energy uses wh ich
can pay up to *£00. 00/acre— foot , or municipal rights
valued at $1 , 300/acre-foot <L_arnrn 1977, £££ ; U. S. Water
News 1985, 1). In the case of municipalities, this
17
could involve condemnation of agricultural rights,
although this is not yet a common pract ice (Vlachos and
Hendricks 1977, 60, 95).
Agriculture in the Basin states accounts for 15.
£
percent of the total value of national crop production,
and 13 percent of the value of national livestock
production (U.S. Water Resources Council 1978a., £5).
While some of this production may be replaced by other
regions, an argument can be made that large transfers
of water out of agriculture, a renewable long—range
resource, into nonrenewable transient energy resources
and industrialization, may destabilize the existing
socio-economic structure and character of the
Southwest. Experts warn against converting too much of
the existing structure to short term uses and fal 1 ing
into the "boom and bust" cycle which has characterized
the region in the past (Kneese and Brown 1981, 7£-73;
Vlachos and Hendricks 1977, 113; Bromley 1980, £44).
Th i s boom and bust eye 1 e was typical of abandoned
mining towns in the region. A recent example is
Batt lenient Mesa, a new town bui It for the oi 1 shale
industry in Colorado. With the recent drop in energy
pr i ces , oil shale is no longer econorn i ca 1 1 y feas i b 1 e to
produce and Battlement Mesa is attempting to convert to
a resort town.
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From the nat ional perspect i ve these transfers out
of agriculture may help meet national economic goals.
However, the state and regional perspective may be
quite different as a result of the loss of jobs and
agricultural income mult i pi iers, and the alterat ion of
the social and environmental character of the region
(Howe I960, £S-S7) . Water allocation policies of the
basin states will play a.r\ important role in determining
the economic, social and environmental character of the
Southwest
.
Water Quant itv, Qual itv and Use
The Colorado River Basin consists mostly of
semi-arid to arid regions which receive annual
prec i p i t at i on rang i ng from 50 i nches in the nort hern
mountains to 4 inches in the southern deserts. As
stated previously, the basin produces the least amount
of wat er per un i t a-rea in the count ry , but i s ca 1 1 ed on
to export as much as a third of its water to
surrounding urban centers. fis is common in arid
environments, stream flows vary widely from season to
season and from year to year, mostly due to variations
in precipitation and spring run-off (see Figure 5).
""he virgin, or natural undepleted flow of the Colorado
River from the Upper Basin, as measured at Lee Ferry
19
FIGURE 5. COLORADO RIVER FLOW AT LEE'S FERRY
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Source: National Research Council (1968, 9).
has varied from approximately 6 mill ion acre-feet in
1934 to approximately £4 million acre-feet in 1917
(National Research Council 1968, 9) . This uncertainty
in the reliability of avai lable water is one of the
reasons westem wat er 1 aws and i nst i t ut i ons deve 1 oped
as they did, in an attempt to provide a degree of
security and priority to an established water right.
Th i s uncert a i nt y has a 1 so creat ed prob 1 ems in the
measurement of avai lable water for al locat ion, and has
created obstacles to the transfer of rights to new uses
(Hartman and Seastone 1970, 15-16).
Water Quant itv
The negotiators of the Colorado River Compact of
19££ based their allotments to the Upper and Lower
Basins on a twenety five year average flow which was
approximately 17 million acre-feet- fts it turned out,
this average was the result of unusually wet years.
The average for the period from 1931-1965 was
approximately 13 million acre-feet which is generally
accepted as a more realistic figure (Howe 1980, ££ }
National Research Council 1968, £4). The Colorado
River is already over-appropriated, although not all
rights are fully utilized in the Upper Basin due to the
lack of enough storage space for its allotment.
However, the U.S. Water Resources Council has found
"ttUhe water supply in the Upper Colorado Region is not
sufficient to meet projected needs, adequate instream
flows, and the terms of the Colorado River Compact"
(U.S. Water Resources Council 1978b., 19).
Water is apportioned between the Upper and Lower
Basins, and the seven states and Mexico by various
compacts, treaties and decrees known as the "Law of the
River". The Colorado River Compact of 1922 guarantees
7.5 million acre-feet per year, or an average of 75
million acre-feet for every ten year period to the
Lower Basin, arid 7.5 million acre-feet per year to the
Upper Basin. The Mexican Water Treaty of 1944
allocates 1.5 million acre-feet per year to Mexico,
which is taken equally from the Upper and Lower Basins.
This means the Upper Basin must allow an average B. £5
million acre-feet (naf) per year flow into the Lower-
Basin. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 194B
allocates 50,000 acre-feet per year to Arizona, out of
its 7.5 maf allotment. The remaining water is divided
as follows: Colorado 51.75 percent, New Mexico 11.25
percent, Utah 23 percent, and Wyoming 14 percent.
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Arizona v. Cal i fornia . 373 U. S. 546 that water in the
Lower Basin would be apportioned as follows: California
4.4 maf plus half of any surplus over
7.5 maf; fir i zona £.8 maf plus half of any surplus over
7.5 maf; Nevada 300,0013 acre-feet plus a possible 4 per
cent of any surplus from Arizona's share.
water Qual itv
In addition to increasing competition and over
appropriation of water resources, the Colorado River
Basin faces severe water quality problems. Water
aual ity in the arid basin is difficult to maintain due
to low flushing volumes arid high concentrations of
salts. Much of the salinity occurs natural ly as a
result of high levels of salts in the en posed
sedimentary rock of the basin, surface runoff,
mineral ized springs, and high erosion rates. The
salinity problem is magnified by many of man's
act i v i t i es which can o ft en i ncrease 1 eve Is of runoff,
erosion, sedimentation, permeability and leaching.
Heavy water use in the fragile arid environment has
raised salinity concentrations to levels which often
prohibit its use for irrigation by the time it reaches
Mexico. Return flows from irrigation leach out salts
from t he so i 1 . Salt 1 oads become more concent rated
with each successive reuse, as the water moves down the
basin, due to consumptive use and evasotranspirat ion.
Salt loads of the Colorado River average around
500-600 riig/1 at Lee Ferry, and can be as high as
1,150 riig/1 at Imperial Dam located just north of Mexico
(U.S. Water Resources Council 1978a., El). This
problem became so acute in 1961, when levels rose to
£,700 nig/1, that Mexico and the United States entered
into negotiations to reduce salinity levels entering
Mexico (Fradkin 1981, 30c!) . fis a result, Congress
established the Colorado River Water Quality
Improvement Program (Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Oct of 1974), to control Upper Basin salinity
sources, artd to provide desalination of return flows
from irrigation projects in Arizona so that fresh water
requirements stipulated by the negotiations could be
met (Vranesh and Cope 1977, 36). Reducing the salinity
problem will be of great benefit to all water users in
the region.'* fi reduction of 1 mg/1 at Imperial Dam
could create *472, 000 of added benefit to water users
(Plummer 1983, 9)
.
Water Use
Water use in the Colorado River Basin is dominated
by agricultural irrigation for both withdrawal and
consumption (see Figure 6 « 7) . In 1975 irrigation
accounted for 93 percent of total water withdrawals in
24
FIUGRE 6. ANNUAL WITHDRAWALS AND CONSUMPTION:
UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
ANNUAL FRESHWATER WITHDRAWALS
1975
Total Withdrawals — 6,869 MGD
2000
Total Withdrawals — 7,619 MGD
ANNUAL FRESHWATER CONSUMPTION
1975
Total Consumption — 2,440 MGD
2000
Total Consumption — 3,232 MGD
Source: U.S. Water Resources Council (1978b., 13).
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FIGURE 7. ANNUAL WITHDRAWALS AND CONSUMPTION:
LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
ANNUAL FRESHWATER WITHDRAWALS
MANUFACTURING
1975
Total Withdrawals — 8,917 MGD
2000
Total Withdrawals — 7,857 MGD
ANNUAL FRESHWATER CONSUMPTION
1975
Total Consumption — 4,595 MGD
2000
Total Consumption — 4,708 MGD
Source: U.S. Water Resources Council (1978a., 15).
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the Upper- Basin, and 90 percent of total consumption.
Irrigated crop land is projected to increase 19 percent
by the year £000 (U.S. Water Resources Council 1978b.,
7). Not only will agriculture require increased water-
supplies for expansion of irrigated acreage, it will
also require increased supplies for 45 percent of
present irrigated acreage which lacks adequate water
for optimum crop production (U. S. WRC. 1978b., 19).
Agriculture will continue to be the major water user in
.the year £000, accounting for 89 percent of total
withdrawals in the Upper Basin and 85 percent of total
consumption. Figure 6 shows the percentage of annual
fresh water withdrawal and consumption for the other
major land use categories in the Upper Basin in 1975
and the year £000. Steam electric generation and
mineral production show projected increases in the
percentage of total withdrawal and consumption. These
increases account for the relative drop in the
percentage of total withdrawal and consumption by
agriculture. Total withdrawals in the Upper Basin are
projected to increase 9. 5 percent by the year £000, and
total consumption is projected to increase 3£ percent.
Figure 7 indicates that water withdrawal and
consumption follow a similar pattern in the Lower
Basin. Irrigation is presently the major water user
and will continue to be in the year £003, although its
relative percentage of total withdrawal and consumption
will drop due to increased production of energy and
mineral resources. However, irrigated acreage in the
Lower Basin is projected to decrease approximately 8.6
percent by the year £000 (U.S. WRC. 1978a. , 7) . Unlike
the Upper Basin, more than half of all water
withdrawals in the Lower Basin are from groundwater.
This reliance on ground water to sustain the economy is
causing severe over-drafts, resulting in depletion of
aquifers as much as 4 to 10 feet a year. It is
expected that this depletion should decrease by £0
percent upon the completion of the Central Arizona and
Southern Nevada projects (U. S. WRC. 1978a., 17-21).
Total withdrawals in the Lower Basin "are projected to
decrease IS percent by the year £000, and total
consumption is projected to increase £.4 percent. When
compared with Upper Basin projections, it is clear that
the Lower Basin has almost fully utilized its water
resources. Appendix ft contains more complete data on
the water budget for both the Upper and Lower Basins.
Public Interest and P'r i vat i zat ion
Federal decentralization will encourage stronger
state and regional planning and management of land and
water resources, however, decentralization has not been
£8
without controversy. filong with this decentralization
policy there has been the suggestion that private
market forces and increased privatization should play a
more significant role in issues of growth, energy
development, natural resource management and water
allocation. Authors supporting this view cite
government failure caused by special interest politics,
short sighted policies, and the lack of incentives for
bureaucratic efficiency. They assert that private
rights and entrepreneursh i p within the private market
lead to better understanding of opportunity costs, more
informed and long range decision making, improved
efficiency and greater economic benefits (Rnderson
1983, 3-7).
Those opposing this view &t-e concerned that
increased privatization poses a continuing threat to
the protection of the public interest. They contend
that a pure market system in common pool resources such
as water does not adequately account for and
internalize third party impacts, or nonmarket factors
such as open space and environmental quality. In this
case, extra—market institutions are required to insure
compliance with public interests (Hartman and Seastone
19713, 1-3; Vlachos and Hendricks 1977,85; Castle 1988,
5-&)
. These conflicting viewpoints have been
demonstrated by the controversies which surrounded
S3
Secretary James Watt and the Department of Interior.
Water allocation institutions in the Southwest have
also been surrounded by this controversy.
Allocation institutions in the Southwest are
usually influenced by the doctrine of prior
appropriation, based on the premise: "first in time —
first in right". This doctrine was established by
miners and ranchers prior to statehood in the seven
basin states and subsequently adopted by all seven
through legislation. Water rights are granted by a
permit system on the basis of beneficial use and
protection of the public interest, or as in the case of
Colorado, through water courts on the basis of
"beneficial use" without specific public interest
protection (Petros 1985, 4).
5
Those who suggest changes in existing
appropriation law charge that it is a frontier doctrine
which encourages waste, is inflexible to changing
demands, and discourages transfers to higher valued
uses (Kneese and Brown 1981, 89-90; Gisser and Johnson
1983, 137-161). Other experts express concern that the
definition of beneficial use used by water courts and
development agencies often does not extend beyond the
economic well-being of the applicant, or target group,
to encompass the sometimes unquant l f iable "general
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public welfare" (White 1977, 187; Dewsnut and Jensen
1973, 30).
Coordinated Land and Water Planning
Most of the water resources in the Colorado River
Basin have been fully developed, and water planning is
undergoing a transition from project development to
management of scarce resources. Some experts are also
suggesting future water planning rnus ; now consider
allocation and management alternatives which are more
coordinated with land use policies at the state level
(Sherman 1977, ££5-££9).-
. . . the method and place of using water is
nearly always dictated by the use of land. It is
difficult if not impossible to control the use of
water unless we also control the use of land.
Gov. Lamm, Colorado (1977, £££)
Water and land use in the arid Southwest are
inseparable and it appears that while Governor Lamm's
statement is correct, the use of land is more often
determined by the quality and availability of water.
Water is important as a factor of production and as an
essential component of life. This raises the issue of
utilizing water allocation laws as a form of land use
planning and growth management tool. While many
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experts agree water and land use planning should become
more coordinated, they have reservations about limiting
allocation to certain land uses.
Most existing water planning organizations, both
public and private, are single purpose agencies dealing
with water development, water delivery or water
quality. The Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers
and the Upper Colorado River Commission all fall in
this category, as do the hundreds of private ditch
companies and municipal water departments which operate
in the basin. It appears that there are few regional
agencies which attempt to coordinate their water
policies with those of land use agencies. In addition
to this lack of coordination, there is a proliferation
of agencies dealing with water in any one area, from
the federal government, down to the local utility.
This creates fragmentation of authority, overlapping
jurisdictions, duplication of capital investment and
excessive private and social costs. Haws states that,
Ctlhe proliferation of water resources
organizations that exist within a given area is a
restraint to effective utilization of water
resources and a hinderence to desirable overall
basin planning and management (1975, 1).
Regional river basin commissions appear to be a
logical organizational structure to coordinate land and
water policy in the Southwest. However, state
governments have usually given such commissions limited
authority and small budgets (Ingram 1978, 7£') . Pis long
as the agencies which deal with land and water remain
uncoordinated, land and water use policies will
continue to contradict each other and magnify the water
management crisis in the Southwest.
Summary
There are many controversies and interrelated
issues involving the management and allocation of water
in the Colorado River Basin. The institutions used to
allocate scarce water amoung competing users will
affect, the outcome of these issues, and will have a
significant impact on the future of both the Southwest
and the nation. Os Phillip Fradkin points out in ft
River No Wore
.
. . . the river's waters and the land surrounding
it in the basin-the heartland of the West-are
fused together in a common destiny, as are those
areas outside the watershed to which Colorado
River water is diverted.
. . . The quantity and
quality of the river's flows are a mirror image of
what is upon the land- indeed, are the prime reason
for there being something built upon or scratched
out of the soil in the first place. How easily
this is forgotten in the urban areas of this oasis
civilization. Not the Rocky Mountains nor the
Pacific Ocean, but the Colorado River ... is the
single most unifying geographical and political
factor in the West. (Fradkin 1981, 1£)
For this reason, it is important to understand
the legal institutions surrounding the ownership and
allocation of water resources in the Colorado River
Basin, and examine how they are changing to meet
demands for an increasingly scarce resource. Chapter
Two will examine the appropriation doctrine and the
interstate compact, the major legal institutions behind
allocation in the basin.
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Chapter 2.
EXISTING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS:
ALLOCATION OF WATER RIGHTS WITHIN AND BETWEEN STATES
The future of the southwestern United States will
be significantly affected by water allocation amoung
competing users in the region. Water institutions will
play a major role in how the water resources of the
Colorado River Basin will be allocated. Fox describes
institutions as either:
. . . an entity; an organization or an individual,
or a rule; a law, regulation, or established
custom. An institutional arrangement is defined
as an interrelated set of entities and rules that
serve to organize societies' activities so as to
achieve social goals. (1978, 9)
This chapter will examine the existing legal
institutions surrounding the ownership and allocation
of water resources. The chapter is divided into four
sections. Part one reviews the characteristics of
water rights and examines the "appropriation
doctrine", the water law generally used in the
Southwest to establish water rights within each state.
The legal basis behind the formation of this doctrine
is reviewed.
Part two addresses the interstate compact, the
legal tool used to apportion Colorado River water
between the seven basin states. This section reviews
the history, Constitutional basis and legal structure
of the interstate compact.
The third section explains the apportionment of
water between the seven basin states, as authorized by
the Colorado River Compact of 19££ and the Upper
Co lorado River Basin Compact of 1948.
Part four examines the court's interpretation of
interstate compacts and equity in allocation, by
reviewing some of the landmark cases in western water
law.
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Part 1
WATER RIGHTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
Prior to examining how water is allocated between
the basin states, or to an individual within a state,
it is important to review the character ist ics of water
rights.
Character ist ics of Water Rights:
Trelease (1974, 5-6) explains that water rights
at-e similar to other property rights, such as those for
minerals or land, except that the renewable and mobile
nature of water requires that the water right be tied
only to its beneficial use, and not the ownership of
water itself. Therefore water rights are usufructuary
property ri ghts. * The ri ght to use' water can
subs t ant ial ly increase the value of land, or a water
dependant activity. In the arid Southwest, water is
the key ingredient to most act i vit ies, and usual ly
requires substant ial capital investment in faci 1 it ies
for its withdrawal and utilisation.
Water laws, the rules governing water rights, are
generally designed to protect investments in water
resources by maximizing the future security of the
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right of ut ilizat ion. Without this insurance, the
long-term growth of a region like the Southwest would
be questionable. Balanced with providing long-run
security of an individual owner's benefits, water law
seeks to maximize benefits to the general public as
well. This is accomplished through regulation to
insure reasonable and beneficial use of water, while
minimizing uses which conflict with the general public
welfare. For example, these regulations include state
water quality standards, as well as restrictions on
wasteful use of water.
The most important aspect of western water rights
is that they help define and enforce a right during
times of scarcity (Howe, Alexander and Moses 198£> .
Definition of a right includes: quantity diverted,
location of diversion and use, duration, and priority
with respect to other rights. fts shortages occur, a
water right guarantees its owner exclusive use of the
full quantity before lower priority rights cari be
utilized. Clear definition and enforcement of a water
right also facilitates the sale, or transfer of the
right to higher valued uses (Trelease 1977).
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Types of Water Rights
fill seven states comprising the Colorado River
Basin exclusively ut i 1 i ze some form of the prior
appropriat ion doctrine, except for Cal ifornia which
uses both the appropriation and riparian systems, to
establish water rights within the state (see Table £) .
Riparian Rights
The riparian doctrine generally allocates water
rights only to the owners of land abutting a river,
lake or stream. The riparian right allows these land
owners to use water only on those adjacent riparian
lands, and the diversion, or sale of water for use on
non—riparian land is usually prohibited. The riparian
user has the right to withdraw as much water as he
wants, as long as he returns enough water so as not to
alter the natural stream course, flow level, a'r water-
quality for down-stream users. Riparian rights Are
appurtenant to a piece of land and Are aquired through
land purchase. c' Riparian rights "run with the land"
and are not alienated when there is a change in land
ownersh i p.
39
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF WATER LAWS BY STATE
IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
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The riparian doctrine, which is governed by common
law, was imported from England where it was developed
for agriculturally based land uses. It is best suited
for humid, water abundant regions characterized by
constant stream flows and a water surplus. riparian
right is perpetual and is not lost through non-use
(Radosevich I960). The riparian doctrine is designed
to insure water availability to all reasonable and
non-injurious uses on riparian lands. Because stream
flows and water quality must remain substantially
unaltered, water use must be generally non—consumpt i ve
in nature. These parameters make the riparian doctrine
less adaptive to urban, industrial, or arid regions
(Dewsnut and Jensen 1973; Trelease 1974).
Appropriation Rights
Rppropriat ion rights are governed by state
statutes. Trelease decsribes these rights as,
. . . a state administrative grant that allows the
use of a specific quantity of water for a specific
beneficial purpose if water is available in the
source free from the claims of others with earlier
appropriations. (1974, 11)
fill seven of the states comprising the Colorado
River Basin have made constitutional, or statutory
declarations that all water is public, or state
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property (Dewsnut and Jensen 1973) . As a result, the
appropriation doctrine "creates the right of private
use of a public resource under certain conditions and
for uses that have been declared to have a public
interest" (Radosevich 1980, £6£) .
The appropriation doctrine evolved out of local
cust oms t o meet the s pec i f i c need s of wat er use i n an
arid environment characterized by irregular stream
flows, and often requiring diversion of water to the
place of need. The doctrine promotes economically
oriented consumptive uses.
Pr
i
orit y of Ripnt . The doctrine is based on the
principle of "f irst-in—t ime, first— in-ri ght " . The
person who makes the first diversion of water for a
beneficial use can take as much water as can be applied
to that use. The priority of the right is establ ished
by the date of diversion, or the date initial act ions
were taken to establ ish the right. In t irnes of water
shortages, the owners of the older, more senior rights
will receive their full allotment before junior rights
receive &r\y water. Water rights s.^e granted freely
until unappropriated water is no longer available,
after which new uses must purchase rights from
established owners. In addition to priority by date,
all the basin states have establ ished statutory
preferences for certain water uses (Dewsnut and Jensen
1973, 35). This preference system generally accords
domestic, municipal and agricultural uses a higher
priority than manufacturing, or industrial uses. The
preference system operates differently in each state.
Sometimes prefered uses are accounted for during
allocation of unappropriated water, and sometimes the
system is implemented only during times of shortage.
Prefered uses in Colorado are given the right of
condemnation, upon payment of compensation (Petros
1985, 6).
Establishing a Right . Petros (1985, £-7) describes
three steps in establishing an appropriation right.
The first involves intent to appropriate. This
includes notification of interested and affected
parties as to the nature and extent of the
appropriation. Application is made to the state
engineer for a permit to appropriate, except in
Colorado, in which the right is established through
adjudication iri district water courts. The second step
involves diversion of the water from its natural
course. This is not a requirement in California and
Colorado for cases involving instream rights, or
minimum stream flows. The third step is the reasonable
application of water to the specified beneficial use.
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The date of the appropriation right relates back to the
date on which the first step was initiated.
Beneficial Use . The fundamental criteria of the
appropriation right is that the water must be put to
beneficial use. Dewsnut and Jensen (1973, 30) explain
that most uses of water are considered beneficial uses,
and that beneficial use is generally equated with
public interest. In addition, the public interest has
often been narrowly interpreted to mean those uses
creating the greatest economic returns (White 1977,
127; Davis 1983, 605). Not only must water be put to a
beneficial use, it must al so be appl ied in a reasonably
efficient and non-wasteful manner. Radosevich refers
to this criteria as the "statutory duty of water"
(1980, £66), in which states establish guidelines on
the number of acre-feet of water per acre of crop land
that is reasonable for irrigation purposes. Several
states such as California and Colorado, have also begun
to recognize in-stream uses of water as beneficial and
in the public interest, and have made it possible to
aquire in-strearn appropriation rights without diverting
water (Vlachos and Hendricks 1977, £1). This allows
uses such as recreation, fish and wildlife, minimum
stream flow, and aesthetic value to have protected
rights and cant inued use of water.
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Definition of a Right . An appropriation right is
defined by a speci f ic amount of water d i verted from a
specific location, for a specific beneficial use.
Additional parameters include: nature of use (storage
or direct flow)
,
place of use, and time of diversion
and use, i.e. days or months (Petros 1985). There is
also Brt implied maintenance of water quality to meet
the needs of the specific use for which the right is
appropriated (Radosevich 198tt)
.
Transfers and Reallocation . Appropriation rights &re
generally considered appurtenant to the land to which
the water is applied. However, the right may be
alienated from the land, sold, and transfered to a new
location subject to certain statutory restrictions such
as non-injury to other users and continued beneficial
use (Valachos and Hendricks 1977). Colorado has the
"purest" form of appropriation and is the least
restrictive on the sale and transfer of water rights.
Describing the distinguishing features of the Colorado
system, Petros indicates that:
Allocation and transfers of water rights &^e based
on private market forces without consideration of
public interest values.
Water rights sye freely changed to other uses and
locations, provided other water rights are not
injured. ( 1985, 4)
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One of the most difficult problems in evaluating
if a transfer will injure other rights concerns the
affect on stream flow. Many water rights rely on the
return flows of water from upstream users, and have a
right to maintenance of these flows (Petros 1985).
Most uses of water consume only a portion of the
diverted right and return the remaining water to the
stream. Because the diversion and use of a right is
tied to a specific location, a change in the location
of the right could alter downstream flows on which
other established rights depend. This is most
pronounced in cases where the new right exports water
outside the basin of origin. To protect down stream
return flow rights, transfered or reallocated rights
may only include a quantity equal to that consumed by
the prior use, and not the amount originally diverted
(Dewsnut and Jensen 1973) . In add it on to the problem
of return flows, when a right is sold and transfered to
a new location, it often loses its original date of
pr i or i t y and is g i ven a priority based on the new date
of transfer. If a stream is fully appropriated, the
new right will have a low priority, and is therefore
less valuable.
Abandonment and f^orfeitu^e . (Radosevich 198®; Dewsnut
and Jensen 1973) Unlike riparian rights, appro pr i at ion
4i
rights are required to be continuously used for a
beneficial use, or they can be lost by abandonment or
statutory forfeiture. Nonuse or misuse of the right
can result in loss of the entire appropriation, or a
portion of it, depending on how much of the right is
involved. Abandonment requires nonuse and the intent
to abandon, and usually is not tied to a specific
length of time. Statutory forfeiture results from
misuse, or nonuse for the specified period of time.
Appropriation rights may also be lost through
condemnat ion.
Formation of Appropriation Giants:
Federal v. State Autho r ity
Despite the common utilization of the
appropriation doctrine in the Southwest, water law
differs from state to state. These differences came
about during the evolution of the appropriation
doctrine, in part due to the actions of Congress, and
the conflict between federal and state authority over
water rights (Trelease 1974).
After the aquisition of the territories comprising
the southwestern states from Mexico in 1848, the
federal government gained complete sovereignty over
this new public domain. The English Common Law
riparian system was extended over these territories, as
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it was in the eastern part of the nation (Kiechel and
Green 1978, £35).
It is generally believed that prior appropriation
was devised in the American West by miners and early
settlers. However, Trelease states that.
. . . the protection of vested rights and a
preference for the eldest rights is the most
common of all systems of distribution of water,
and many of these go back to antiquity and can in
no sense be said to be derived from American law
(1977, 59).
Rs miners and settlers moved to public lands in
the western territories, they began diverting water for
mining and irrigation needs. Because they were often
trespassing on public lands for whicn they were not
receiving title, they aquired " incor-olete possessory
interests" (Simms 1980, 87). Establishment of water
rights according to the riparian system was
inappropriate due to lack of ownership of the land,
hydrologic constraints of the arid environment, and the
need to divert water. Because there was no local
government, or federal laws governing water use, these
appropr iators established their own rules and customs
governing mining claims, irrigation, and water rights.
Common laws and local customs developed into the
doctrine of prior appropriation, and were adopted by
statute in the newly forming western states. This
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doctrine is also known as the Colorado Doctrine,
because Colorado was the first state to adopt it in its
const itut ion in 1876.
As growth cont inued in the western states, it
became apparent that a conflict was developing between
state arid federal authority in administering water
rights on western public lands. Recognizing this
conflict and the importance of promoting mineral and
agricultural development, Congress passed three acts
which recognized prior appropriation rights on public
lands: the Mining Act of 1B66, the Oct of 1870, and the
Desert Land Oct of 1877.
A number of authors explain that the western
states, including all the Colorado Basin states except
California, allocated water rights on public lands
based on the premise that through these three acts, the
federal government had transferee! to the states its
authority over water rights and its claim to
unappropriated water (see Kiechel and Green 1978;
Trelease 1974; Davis 1983; and Simms 1980). The Mining
Act of 1886 recognized prior appropr iat ions and
rights-of-way for diversions on public lands, provided
they followed state laws. The Act of 1870 made all
federal patents, preemptions and homesteads subject to
previously vested water rights established under state
laws. The Desert Land Act of 1877 al lowed a settler to
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buy tracts of desert land on public domain by filing a
declaration stating an intent to use irrigation to
reclaim the land subject to prior appropriation, and
limiting diversions to the quantity needed for
irr i gat ion.
California posed the only threat to the premise of
state authorized appropriation rights on public lands
(Hundley 1975, 69-72). In Lux v. Haggin . 69 Cal. ££5
(1386), the California court found that a person
receiving title to federal lands also received riparian
rights on that land by virtue of the federal patent.
Both doctrines would apply in California, but the
riparian doctrine would be superior, limited only by
prior appropriations of water established before the
patent date. The court also found that the federal
government owned all unappropriated water on public
lands, based on the "right of absolute territorial
sovereignty" (Hundley 1975, 71). While the federal
government had delegated authority to the states to
distribute water, the court found that Congress had not
surrendered its rights to unappropriated water, and
could revoke state authority over distribution.
More recently, the western states relied on an
interpretation of the Desert Land Pet of 1S77 made by
the United States Supreme Court. In ruling on Oregon
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Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement , the court
found
:
If this language is to be given its natural
meaning ... it effected a severance of all
waters upon the public domain, not theretofore
appropriated, from the land itself. . . . What we
hold is that following the Oct of 1877, if not
before, all non-navigable waters then a part of
the public domain became public juris, subject to
the plenary control of the designated states . . .
with the right in each to determine for itself to
what extent the rule of appropriation or . . .
riparian rights should obtain. For since
'Congress cannot enforce any rule upon any state'
. . . the full power of choice must remain with
the state. (£95 U.S. 142, 1935)3
Trelease asserts that the reasoning behind this
ruling is weak, and that while the three Acts do
recognise existing appropriations maoe according to
state laws, their language does not authorize state law
to establish future water rights (1974, E9-3S).
"release finds that,
. . . state laws have validity not because of an
act of Congress but because of the 'silent
aquiescence' of the federal government. Water law
was the subject of concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction. The states could excercise their
traditional jurisdiction unless their laws were
superseded by a federal law disposing of the
water. Since the federal government r\ever enacted
such a law, the state law stocid. <197A, 33)
Kiechel and Green make a similar argument, adding
that the federal government holds riparian rights on
all lands which it has reserved for federal purposes,
subject only to appropriations made prior to the
reservat ion. Therefore, federal reserved ri ghts are
act ua 1 1 y ri par i an rights based on the ownersh i p of the
public domain, as found in Winters v. United States ,
207 U.S. 564 (1908). They find that the existence of
federal reserved rights is well established. However,
there is still much controversy over how much water
these rights can claim for federal purposes (1978,
£33-£38) . Th is controversy also extends to Indian
reserved rights. Quant if icat ion of Indian rights may
have more impact on established appropr iators than
federal rights. Congress may dispose of federal land
and reserved rights as it wishes. However, Congress
can not disclaim Indian rights, some of which may be
based on original property claims (Dewsnut and Jensen
1973, 73).
In addition to the federal proorietary rights on
public domain, Dewsnut and Jensen (1973, 8-9) describe
federa 1 regulatory powers over wat er wh i ch come from
the commerce clause of the Constitution. This clause
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. This power is usually manifested in
the regulation of navigable and tributary waters, to
insure the cont inued nav igabl ity of rivers and other
bodies of water. In addition, Congress may regulate
any water activity wh ich somehow affects i nt erst at
e
commerce, such as overly restrictive limitations on
water export out of a basin.
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Part £
INTERSTATE ALLOCATION OF WATER RESOURCES:
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
States have three legal alternatives for solving
interstate conflicts, and all three have been used in
disputes involving the apportionment of water resources
in the Southwest (see Dewsnut and Jensen 1973; Muys
1971; Muys 1977; and Trelease 1974). Perhaps the most
costly and time consuming alternative is litigation in
the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the
court makes an "original action" based on the doctrine
of equitable apportionment.^ This alternative has
frequently been used, producing such cases as Kansas v.
Colorado (1907), Wyoming v. Colorado (1982), and
Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945).
The second alternative, statutory apportionment,
became apparent after the Supreme Court ruled on
Arizona v. Cal ifornia in 1963. Statutory apportionment
involves a Congressional action, and is based on
Congressional authority to regulate interstate
commerce. This is the only case involving statutory
apportionment of water resources (Dewsnut and Jensen
1973).
The third alternative, the interstate compact, is
the oldest and perhaps most beneficial alternative for
resolving interstate conflicts. Both the Supreme Court
and Congress recommend the use of the interstate
compact to apportion water resources because it
promotes better cooperation and coordination among the
concerned states (Muys 1971). Water problems, such as
those found in the Colorado River Basin, often require
coord i nat ed reg i ona 1 so 1 ut i ons beyond the scope of a
single state. Litigation and statutory apportionment
can not provide coordinated planning efforts, as does
the interstate compact.
The Co 1 orado Bas i n st at es have usea all t h ree
alternat i ves for resolving interstate water disputes.
No mat t er wh i ch met hod of a p port i onment i s used , the
result is a quantification of water rights among the
states. These rights remain subordinate to the
superior federal power to regulate interstate commerce
and navigation. fis a result, Congress may at any time
restrict these rights, even if it has approved an
interstate compact (Dewsm.it and Jensen 1973, 70) .
Historical and Legal Found at i on
The interstate compact comes direct ly from
colonial America, when boundary disputes between
colonies were resolved by agreements drawn-up by the
co 1 on i es and ap proved by t he Crown ( V 1 achos and
Hendricks 1377; Muys 1971, £41 ) - This approach was
adopted in the Prt icles of Confederat ion, and was later
included in the Constitution of the United States as
the compact clause.
No state shall, without the consent of Congress,
. . . enter into any agreement or compact with
another state or with a Foreign power. (U.S.
Const, art icle I, sect ion ltf, clause 3)
It is believed that this clause was included in
the Const itut ion to provide rel ief for the cont inuing
border disputes between the emerging states. The
Supreme Court has held in a series of cases ( Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts
. 1838; Florida v. Georgia
.
1854; Sind Virginia v. Tennessee . 1893) that the compact
clause is protective in nature, and provides Congress
with a veto power over interstate agreements to insure
the protection of other states and the national
interest (Mays 1971 )
.
Legal Characteristics
Muys describes a number of legal character ist ics
concerning interstate compacts which have been
identified by the Supreme Court (1971, £41-3£c!).
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Congressional Consent
As previously mentioned, the compact clause of the
Const itut ion provides a veto power to Congress to
i nsure prot ect i on of all st at e and federa 1 i nt erest s in
any interstate agreement. The consent requirement is
assumed to apply to any water compact, although
compacts which do not affect national interests, or
conflict with state and federal statutes, have an
apparent "blanket consent". Examples of compacts
covered by blanket consent a>~e administrative compacts,
and compacts designed to promote planning coordination
without placing any restrictions on the signatory
states or the federal government.
Timing and Form of Consent
The Constitution makes no specific mention of when
or how consent by Congress should be made, however the
Supreme Court has found that some act ion by Congress is
required. Congressional action may either precede or
follow negotiation, and expressly or impliedly indicate
consent to the compact. Congress often grants "consent
to negotiate" to the compacting states, on the
condition that a federal representative will
participate in the negotiations, arid that any resulting
compact must be approved by Congress.
Gondii ions and Reservat ions
Congress may amend on revoke its consent to a
compact. The act of consenting does not prevent
Congress from subsequent ly enact ing legislat ion wh ich
conflicts with its consent. Congress often attaches
provisions, or conditions to its consent which must be
met by the signatory states. In addition, the states
usual ly protect federal rights by including disclaimers
in the corn pact which claim t h at the prov i s i ons of the
compact in no way effect the rights, powers or
obi i gat i ons of the federal government
.
En forcea b i
1
1 1 y
Any signatory state is unconditionally bound to
the provisions of art interstate compact unt i 1 the
agreement has expired. In addition, the compact is
superior to any subsequently conflicting state
statutes, by provision of the Constitutional
restriction against state impairment of contracts. The
compact obligations are also superior to water rights
established prior to the compact.
Delegation of Powers
fi state may delegate some or all of its police
powers, including its taxing authority, to ar\
interstate compact agency. In addition, the federal
government may delegate greater powers to such a
Comm i ss i on t h an the states possess , if it so w i shes.
J udicial Review
Interstate compacts ar^e ratified into state law
and therefore at^e subject to interpretation as a
"federal quest ion" by the Supreme Court.
Types of Interstate Water Compacts
There ar& four types of interstate compacts: water
al locat ion, pol 1 ut ion control, planning and flood
control, and mult 1 pur pose—regulatory compacts (Muys
1971; 1977, 83-90).
The first interstate water compacts in the country
were establ ished in the Colorado River Basin, and dealt
with water allocation. Both the Colorado River Compact
of 19£S, and the Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948
fa 11 within this category. The early al locat ion
compacts provided ecuitabie apportionment of water
between the signatory states, and authorised state
officials to col lect Hydro logic data and keen records.
Later compacts, including the Upper Colorado River
Pas i n Compact ( 1 948 ) , prov i d ed a permanent cornm 1 ss i on
and adrnimstrat i ve staff to perform data col lect ion and
adrninistrat ion of the compact provisions, including
such duties as use curtailment during water shortages
(Gosl in 1977, £01). The compact commission is made up
of one voting representative from each signatory state,
and a non-voting representative of the federal
government. PI 1 eighteen water al locat ion compacts
involve western st ates.
There &re ten interstate pollution control
compacts addressing either single purpose pol 1 ut ion
issues, or more comprehensive water quality planning
and management. The authority given their commissions
ranges from enforcing pollution standards, to making
recommendations and setting quality standards.
Muys explains there ar^e a small number of planning
and flood control compacts which were associated with
the the federal flood control program during the
1930' s. These have been very limited in scope, and are
for the most part no longer act ive ( 1977, 88)
.
The multipurpose-regulatory compact (usually a
federal-interstate compact) is a more recent
development in which the cornm i ssi on has greater
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authority to regulate water resources, as well as
coordinate and develop comprehensive management plans
on a basin-wide level. This management authority
includes the power to license, regulate and construct
development projects. The comprehensive nature of this
type of compact, requires that the federal government
be art equal, voting signatory partner so that state and
federal policies will be coordinated under, and
accountable to the terms of the compact. The
federal-interstate compact differs from the other three
types of compacts, in which the federal government
usually has a non-voting representative on the
commission. In addition, these other compacts provide
less coordination between state and federal policies
(Trelease 1974; Muys 1977).
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Part 3
APPORTIONMENT OF THE COLORADO RIVER:
THE TWO COMPACTS
Water rights in the Colorado River Basin are
established within each of the seven basin states
according to the doctrine of prior appropriation. Water
resources are apportioned between the seven basin
states according to two major interstate water
.compacts: the Colorado River Compact of 19££, and the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1946. There are
also a handful of lesser interstate compacts which
cover various tributaries of the Colorado River. This
section will provide a general overview of the two
principal compacts and their apportionment provisions.
The Colorado River Compact-192£
There are a number of authors who give accounts of
the development of the 19££ compact (see Fradkin 1981;
Hundley 1975; and Goslin 1977). The Colorado River
Compact of 19££ was the first interstate, al locative
water compact in the United States. The compact was the
result of unsuccessful negotiations to apportion
specific amounts of water to each of the seven basin
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states. The compact is a compromise, apportioning the
basin's waters between the Upper and Lower Basins.
During the negotiations, Arizona was apprehensive
about the lack of an interstate agreement between the
Lower basin states, and expressed concern that
California would attempt to pre-empt most of the Lower
Basin's allocation, based on the decision in Wyoming v.
Colorado . £59 U.S. 413 (1922), which upheld prior
appropriation across state lines. For this reason,
Arizona refused to sign the 1922 compact. This action
delayed Congressional consent of the compact as well as
authorization of the Boulder Canyon project, the first
major multipurpose project on the river, which would
largely benefit California. Congressional consent was
given to a six state compact excluding Arizona in 1928,
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act was enacted.
Consent was given upon the condition that Calilfornia
pass legislation limiting its consumption to a specific
quantity of water. California accepted this condition
and the six states, excluding Arizona, ratified the
Colorado River compact in 1929. Arizona finally
ratified the compact in 1944 after three unsuccessful
suits against Calilfornia.
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Ma
r
ior Provisions of the Compact
Pub. L. No. 70-642, Sec. 12-19, 43 Stat. 1057 (1928)
Article I of the Colorado River Compact states the
purposes of the interstate agreement.
The major purposes of this compact are to provide
for the equitable division and a p port i onrnent of
the use of the waters of the Colorado River
System; to establish the relative importance of
d i f ferent benef i c i a 1 uses of wat er ; to promote
interstate comity; to remove causes of present
and future controversies; and to secure the
expeditious agricultural and industrial
development of the Colorado River Basin, the
storage of its waters, and the protection of life
and property from floods. To these ends the
Colorado River Basin is divided into two Basins,
and an a p port i onrnent of the use of part of the
water of the Colorado River System is made to eacn
of them with the provision that further equitable
apportionments may be made.
These same general statements have served as a
model for other al locative interstate compacts,
i nc 1 ud i rig t he Upper Co 1 orado R i ver Compact ( 60s 1 in
1977, 137).
Art icle III (a) establ ishes the a p port ionment to
each basin as:
. . . the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of
7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum, which
shall include all water necessary for the supply
of any rights which may now exist.
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Article III (b) allows the Lower Basii-i "to
increase its beneficial consumptive use of such waters
by one million acre-feet per annum.
"
Article III (c) provides that if the United States
recognizes any rights by Mexico to the use of Colorado
River Basin water, those rights will be supplied first
by surplus water. If a surplus is too low,' then the
deficiency will be supplied equally by the Upper and
Lower Basins.
Article III (d) provides that the Upper Basin may
not allow the flow at Lee Ferry to fall below
75, 00i2i, iZu?Ci acre-feet for any ten-consecutive year
per i od
.
Article III (e) establishes that the Upper Basin
may not withhold water, and the Lower Basin shall not
require deliveries beyond what can reasonably be used
for domestic and agricultural purposes. The compact's
definition of domestic use includes: household, stock,
municipal, mining, milling and industrial uses, but
excludes power generation.
Article VII is a disclaimer.
Nothing in this compact shall be construed as
affecting the obligations of the United States of
America to Indian Tribes.
Article VIII and IX establish that the Compact
does not affect previously established water rights, or
limit any state from act ions wh ich protect r i ghts under
the compact.
The most i mport ant prov i s i ons made in the compact
are the terms of apportionment under Article III and
the disclaimer in Art icle VII concerning Indian tribes.
Compacts similar to this one, which do not quant if
y
federal and Indian reserved rights, underestimate the
true water needs of each state. As these federal and
Indian rights are quantified, they may have to come out
of the appropriations in the state in which they are
vested. It is also important to note that this compact
makes al locat ions based on the idea of equitable
apportionment for beneficial consumptive uses. As
shown in Chapter One, the 7. 5 maf al lotment per basin
has caused further problems because it was based on an
assumed annual flow of 17 million acre—feet, which has
been found to be much too high. This has resulted in
an over appropriat ion of more water than actual ly
ex ists in most years. This compact did not provide for
a commission to oversee its implementation.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact -1946
In 1946, following the enactment of the Compact of
19££ and the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 19£8, the
Bureau of Reclarnat ion made a comprehensive study of the
£6
whole basin. It recommended a series of projects to
promote development and facilitate deliveries of water
under the Compact of 19££ (see Fradkin 1981; Muys 1971;
and Goslin 1977). Many of these projects were designed
for the Upper Basin states, which had been warned that
they would not be pushed through Congress, unless an
interstate agreement was ratified apportioning water
between the Upper Basin states. This precaution was a
reaction to the endless litigations between the Lower
.Basin states of Arizona and California over water
rights. The Lower Basin states never reached ari
agreement to apportion water, and the matter was
finally settled by the Supreme Court in flr i zona v.
California . 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
The enactment of the Boulder Canyon Project Oct
carried with it, Congressional consent for the Upper
Basin states to begin negotiation of a compact, on the
condition that a representative of the United States be
involved in the negotiations. The Upper Basin states
began negotiations in 1946 on an interstate compact
which would apportion the Upper Basin's allotment,
under the Compact of 19££. The compact was approved by
Congress in 1949.
£7
Maior Provisions of the Compact
Pub. L. No. 81-37, 63 Stat. 31 (1949)
fir-tide I (a) establishes the purposes of the
compact
.
The major purposes of this Compact are to provide
for the equitable division and apportionment of
the use of the waters of the Colorado River
system, the use of which was apportioned in
perpetuity to the Upper Basin by the Colorado
River Compact; to establish the obligations of
each State of the Upper Division with respect to
the deliveries of water required to be made at Lee
Ferry by the Colorado River Compact; to promote
interstate comity; to remove causes of present
and fututre controversies; to secure the
expeditious agricultural and industrial
development of the Upper Basin, the storage of
water and to protect life and property "from
floods.
Article I (b) establishes recognition of the
Colorado River Compact of 19££, and acknowledges all of
its provisions.
Article III apportions the waters of the Upper
Basin between the five states. Arizona is apportioned
50, 0i?@ acre-feet per annum for consumptive use. The
remaining annual Upper Basin apportionment is allocated
to the other states based on a percentage figure. This
is to account for the fluctuations in actual available
water from one year to the next. The percentages are
as fol lows
:
6S
State of Colorado 51.75 per- cent,
State of New Mexico 11.25 per cent,
State of Utah 23.08 per cent,
State of Wyoming 14.00 pen cent.
Article IV explains the procedure for use
curtailment in the Upper Basin, if it becomes
necessary, to insure that the flow at Lee Ferry will
not fall below the 7. 5maf/10 year average, as
stipulated in the 1922 Compact.
Article VII explains that consumptive use "by the
United States or any of its agencies, instrumentalities
or wards" will be charged to the state in which it is
used. This applies to federal and Indian rights.
Article VIII establishes an interstate commission
with the authority to curtail water use during
shortages, and to perform other duties including: data
collection, and finding of fact concerning water-
quality and consumption.
Article XVI establishes that failure by any state
to use its apportionment in full will not constitute a
forfeiture or abandonment of rights.
Article XVIII establishes recognition of the
rights of Arizona and New Mexico, as Lower Basin
states, under the Colorado River Compact of 1322.
Article XIX is a disclaimer stating that this
Compact in no way affects federal obligations to Indian
£3
tribes, the Mexican government under the Treaty of
1944, or any federal r i ghts or powers.
Article XX explains that "this Compact may be
terminated at any time by the unanimous agreement of
the signatory states. In the event of such
terminat ion, all rights est ab 1 i shed under it shal
1
cont inue unimpaired"
.
fis in the earlier compact, the most important
Art icles are I and III where the purpose of the compact
i s set out , and the a p port i onment s t o each st at e are
establ ished. Article VII and XIX create an
under-appropr iat ion to states having large federal and
Indian rights which may be quantified against their
al location.
Unl ike other tradit ional compacts, the Upper
Basin Compact creates a commission in which the federal
representat ive is a vot ing member, sirni lar to the
federal-interstate compact. This promotes better
coordination of state and federal planning within the
basin.
Together, the Colorado River Compact of 19££ and
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948
establish definite apportionments of water use rights
between the seven basin states. The major drawback
with both compacts is that they do not account for
specific quantities of federal and Indian rights, which
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make up a large percentage of senior water rights in
the basin. Both the federal government and the Indian
tribes are beginning to express the desire to develop
their water rights. fis these rights become quantified
within the courts, the seven basin states may have to
make difficult decisions over which water users must
forgo their rights. However, once the federal and
Indian rights are quantified, the Upper Basin Compact
appears to be more capable of providing coordinated
federal and state management, due to its similarities
to the federal-interstate compact. As Muys (1971;
1977) has asserted, the federal-interstate approach is
the best way to promote comprehensive water planning in
the Southwest.
Part 4
LANDMARK CASES IN WESTERN WATER LAW
Part One of this chapter examined water rights arid
the doctrine of prior appropriation, the water law
which dictates the establ iehment of water rights within
western states. Part Two and Three examined the
characteristics of the interstate compact, and reviewed
the two major compacts which control interstate water
allocations in the Colorado River Basin. This section
will briefly review the courts interpretation of
interstate apportionments established under the
doctrine of prior appropriation and the interstate
water compact.
As was noted in the introduction to Part Two,
there are three approaches available for solving
conf 1 icts in al locat ing interstate waters: the
interstate compact , Congresssional "at at utory
apport ionrnent "
, and 1 it i gat ion in the Supreme Court of
the Un i ted States. The first few cases concern the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the doctrine of prior
appropr iat ion.
7£
Equitable A pport ionment arid
the Supreme Court
The only tribunal with original jurisdiction over
interstate disputes is the Supreme Court of the United
States. Unt i 1 the development of the Colorado River
Compact of 19££, 1 it igat ion in the Supreme Court was
the only method usea by the Colorado Basin states to
solve their conflicts over interstate water allocation.
The negotiators of the 19S£ Compact had two landmark
cases on which to base their compact: Kansas v.
Colorado (1907) and Wyoming v. Colorado (1922).
Kansas v. Colorado
Supreme Court of the United States, 1907.
£06 U.S. 46, £7 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed- 956.
The conf 1 ict involved the Arkansas River which
originates in Colorado and flows eastward into Kansas.
As the number of diversions increased, Kansas became
concerned that Colorado would divert all the water,
causing substantial injury to Kansas farmers. Kansas
t ook the case to the S u preme Court in 1 90 1
.
Justice Brewer delivered the majority opinion:
Qne cardinal rule, underlying all the relat ions of
the states to each other, is that of equity of
right. Each state stands on the same level with
all the rest. . . this court is ca 1 led upon to
settle that dispute in such a way as will
recognize the equal rights of both and at the same
time establ ish just ice between them. . . through
these successive disputes and decisions this court
is pract icai ly bui lding up what may not improperly
be called interstate common law. (£06 U.S. 4&,
19137) 5
The Court found that although there is presently
no injury to Kansas, cont inued diversions may destroy
the equitable apport ionment of benefits in the future,
at which time Kansas may bring a new claim to court.
The importance of this case is that the Court
.established that the rule of "equitable apportionment
of benefits" would be used on a case by case basis to
determine each state's share. Until a series of cases
established an interstate common law, the states would
have to continue to use Supreme Court litigations, or
use interstate agreements, to rectify interstate water
d isputes.
The controversy between Kansas and Colorado came
up again in 1943. The Supreme Court again found that
Kansas failed to show serious injury to its equitable
apport ionment (Tre lease 1974, 662) . In 1986, Kansas
has again filed suit against Colorado over^ the
apport ionment of the Arkansas River. This shows that
despite previous 1 it igat ion and the development of the
Arkansas River Compact (1949), there can be continued
disputes over interstate allocation.
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Ulyomiriq v. Colorado
Supreme Court of the United States, 1922
£59 U.S. 413, 42 S.Ct. 552, 6£ L.Ed. 999.
The second case of importance involving interstate
apportionment was decided in the same year that the
first interstate water compact was established, the
Colorado River Compact of 1922. The negotiators for
the Upper and Lower Basins were keenly interested in
the outcome of this case because it could influence the
apportionments in the Compact. In delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Van Devanter stated that
the case was similar to Kansas v. Colorado <19i27> in
that it required the Court to look at the "equitable
rights" of the states.
The Court upheld the doctrine of prior
appropriation across state boundaries, stating that:
Each of these states applies and enforces this
rule in her own territory, art^i it is the one to
which intending appropr lators naturally would turn
for guidance. The principle on which it proceeds
is not less applicable to interstate streams. . .
(259 U.S. 419, 1922)6
This case was important because it established
prior appropriation as the rule to apply in interstate
water disputes where both states utilize this dC'Ctrine
to establish rights within their boundaries. Because
the Colorado River Compact of 1922 was signed in the
same year establishing the interstate compact as a new
tool for interstate apportionment, the full impact of
this case may r\ever be known.
Nebraska v. Wyoming
Supreme Court of the United States, 1945
3£5 U.S. 583, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 69 L.Ed. 1815
Nebraska f i led suit claiming that a severe water
shortage existed due to over-aporopr iat ion and
mis-appropriation by upstream users (Wyoming and
Colorado). Nebraska sought the relief of equitable
a pport ionment under the prior appro or i at ion doctrine.
The op ini on of the Court was delivered by Justice
Douglas and established that prior appropriation would
be applied in this case, because all three states in
the dispute were appropriat ion states. This finding
following the ruling in Wyoming v. Colorado tl3££)»
But, in an interesting development tne Court continued
by saying:
But if an al locat ion between appropriat ion states
is to be just and equitable, strict adherence to
the priority rule may not be possi ble. For
example, the economy of a reg i on may have been
es t a b 1 i shed on the bas is of juni or a ppropr i at i on*.
So far as possible those establ ished uses should
be protected though strict application of the
priority rule might jeopardize them.
Ppport ionment calls for the exercise of an
informed judgement on a consideration of many
factors. (335 U.S. 569, 1945)7
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In this case the Court came back to the original
ruling of Kansas v. Colorado (1307), in which it
established equitable apportionment as the rule for
interstate disputes. This softened the impact of the
decision in Wyoming v. Colorado (19££) by saying that
prior appropriations would be used as a guiding
principle. However, other factors would also be
considered to insure equitaole apportionment of
benefits.
Interstate Compacts
.
and
the Supreme Court
Interstate water compacts were established between
disputing states as an alternative to the costly,
t i me—consuming litigation in the Supreme Court. The
case which is presented here is not between the
compacting states, but between a corporation and one of
the compacting states.
Hinder 1 ider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1338
304 U.S. 32, 58 S.Ct. 803, 8£ L.Ed. 1202
The Court found that apportionments made by
interstate compacts, with congressional consent or by
Supreme Court decree, are binding upon the citizens of
each state arid all water claimants, even when the state
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has granted rights prior to the date of the compact.
This meant that interstate compacts are superior to any
prior right establ ished by the state, part icularly when
such prior right exceeded a state 1 s apport ionrnent under
the compact.
Congressional ftp port ionrnent
The Court's interpretation of interstate compacts,
and water rights based on prior appropriation has been
demonstrated. The third method of establishing
interstate apportionments is through Congressional
statutory a poor t ionrnent, which was brought to light in
Arizona v. Cal ifornia (1963).
Arizona v. Cal ifornia
Supreme Court of the United States, 1963
373 U.S. 546, S3 S. Ct.1468, 10L. Ed. £d 572
This is the last of a long series of cases between
Arizona and California. In 195£ Arizona appealed once
more to the Supreme Court, asking for a determinat ion
of Lower Basin water rights.
The Court found that Congress had imposed
"statutory apport ionrnent " on the Lower Basin States
wh en 1 1 passed the Bo u 1 der Canyon Proj ect Act of 1 9£S.
These apportionments were as follows:
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California 4.4 maf/year,
Nevada 3 waf/year,
Ar i zona £.8 maf /year.
Congress had also given the Secretary of Interior
the authority to determine how future water surpluses
and shortages would be divided between the three
states. The most controversial part of the Court's
decision was its interpretation that this authority
could go as far as authorizing the Secretary of
Interior to allocate water to specific users within a
state during times of shortage.
The major impact of this case was three-fold.
First, Arizona got all the water it had been fighting
for since it first refused to sign the Colorado River
Compact of 19££, thus putting to rest the long conflict
between Arizona and California. Now the Lower Basin
had specific apportionments for each state to follow,
as established through statutory apportionment.
Secondly, the Court identified and sustained the
federal government's claims that it had established
Inoian reserved rights on reservations within the
basin. The Court ruled that these reservations had
prior rights providing enough water to irrigate all the
practicably irrigable land on the reservations.
Although the Court stopped short of adjudicating
specific quantities of water for this purpose, it did
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considerably strengthen Indian reserved rights in the
western states.
The third major impact of the decision was the
identification of a third method of allocating water
between states, that being Congressional statutory
apportionment. In essence, this meant that Congress
had the power and the tool to determine priorities for
water, both between states and within states. State
law no longer had supreme rule over western
apportionments. The Court stated that Congress derived
this authority from the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution.
It appears that Arizona v. Cal ifomia (1963) is
the land-mark case in western water law, because
Congress now has the confirmed authority to indirectly
determine the growth rates, and land-use patterns
within the West, through its statutory allocation of
water resources. It remains to be seen how far
Congress will actually go with this power to shape the
future of the West and the nation.
Chapter 3
PROBLEMS AND EMERGING TRENDS:
TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION OR PUBLIC TRUST
Chapter Two examined the doctrine of prior
appropriation and the interstate compact, the two major
legal institutions utilised for establishing and
allocating water rights in the Colorado River Basin.
Chapter Three will examine some of the problems,
recommendations and emerging trends in these
institutions, and discuss their implications on future
water planning and management in the Colorado River
Basin.
Interstate Compacts
:
Regional PI locat ion and Coordinated Planning
As discussed in Chapter Two, water is al located
between the Colorado Basin states through two major
interstate water compacts. There a^e many advantages
to using this approach for interstate al locat ion and
coordination of planning efforts, as opposed to the
alternative of using interstate ad hoc committees.
SI
Advantages of Interstate Compacts
P number of authors describe the advantages of
using interstate compacts to address water resource
planning and management (see Muys 1971, 1977; Trelease
1974; and Goslin 1977). Because the interstate compact
?.s a negotiated agreement between signatory states, it
can be tailored to the unique conditions and needs of a
region. The compact can be directed at a single
objective, or a comprehensive regional management plan.
Compacts can provide an administrative institution with
equal representation of individual state, federal, or
Indian interests, as well as providing a regional
perspective. With respect to water allocation, the
compact is a cooperative agreement, as opposed to an
adjudicatory process, which results in better
communication and coordination of planning and
management policies between states. Coordination of
planning and management efforts provides the
opportunity to combine professional, capital and data
resources, and reduce duplication. Federal-interstate
compacts facilitate coordination between national and
state policies, and promote greater public
participation in the planning process (Muys 1977,
90-99)
.
8£
Soslin (1977, £08) identifies some additional
advantages of the interstate compact. First, it
protects a state's unused apportionment of water from
prior appropriation, or adverse possesion by other
states. This is important to the Upper Colorado Basin
states because they have not fully developed or
utilized their allotments of water. Because the
compact defines the rights of each state, it reduces
the potential for litigation. Secondly, the Upper-
Colorado River Basin Compact (1948) has politically
unified the Upper Basin states behind passage of
federal legislation which will facilitate development
and growth in the region, as was seen with the Colorado
River Storage Project Oct (1956). Finally, the
existence of interstate compacts in the western states,
has promoted better cooperation of federal agencies
because they feel more obligated to abide by a
Congressional ly approved agreement (Goslin 1977, £08).
Disadvantages of Compacts
There are four major problems with traditional
interstate water compacts identified by Muys (1977,
94-100). First, many states have shown a lack of
commitment to a truely regional planning approach, and
are more concerned with protection of their individual
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interests. States are reluctant to delegate planning
and decision making authority to interstate
commissions. Secondly, interstate compacts require
negotiation and ratification by state legislatures, and
must be approved by Congress. This can be a slow
process to complete, and on occasion, has been used to
delay implementation of federal or state programs.
Thirdly, many of the allocation compacts were
ratified before the Supreme Court decision in P,r 1 zona
y. Cal i fornia (1963), in which the Court clarified the
reservation doctrine applying to federal and Indian
water rights. Because these compacts do not account
for federal arid Indian reserved rights, they
under-est imate the required allocations to states with
large tracts of federal and Indian lands. This problem
occured with both the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact (1348), and the Colorado River Compact (19££).
A related problem involves the interpretation of use
curtailment procedures during times of water shortages
(Goslin 1977). If the language of the compact is not
specific enough, it can lead to potential litigations.
Finally, Muys says the major problem with
traditional interstate compacts has been the lack of
federal participation on a level greater than a
non-voting observer. The ubiquitous role of the
federal government in western land and water planning
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requires its participation in any comprehensive
planning effort. The development of the
federal-interstate compact has resolved many of these
problems (1977, 94-101)
.
The Fut ure of Int erst
a
te_
C
ompact
s
The federal-interstate compact appears to be ari
appropriate institutional arrangement for coordinated
comprehensive water planning in the western states- In
the conclusion of his extensive study of interstate
compacts, Muys recommends,
Ct3he federal-interstate compact should be
encouraged as the prefered inst it ut ional
arrar\ g ernent for re g i ona 1 wat er resource p 1 arm ing
and management. (1971, 388)
With improvements to streaml ine the rat if icat ion
process, and instal lat ion of greater authority to the
compact commission, the federal -interstate compact
will provide an effective coordinating mechanism
between federal, state and Indian interests in the
West. This institution can insure that federal and
Indian rights are accounted for in al locat ing and
re a 1 locat ing water among the compact members. The
federal government becomes a voting member of the
compact, and is bound to the compact provisions "to the
extent constitutionally permissible" (Muys 1977, liZuZD.
B5
Because the Upper Colorado Basin Compact ( 1948)
i ric 1 udes the federa 1 government as a vot i ng part ner , i
t
appears to have potent ial for coordinat ing state and
federal water resource planning in the future, once
federal and Indian reserved rights have been f ul ly
quant if ied. The Colorado Basin Compact ( 19££) , having
no provisions for a commission or equal federal
involvement, is limited to dividing the waters between
the Upper and Lower Basin. While it is unlikely
tnatColorado Basin states would agree to reallocating
interstate apportionments, it may be necessary to
negotiate a net* multipurpose compact, with specific
provisions aimed at achieving comprehensive planning in
the entire basin. An interstate compact could also be
expanded to include land resources as well to achieve
coordinated land and water planning.
Perm it v. Court Syst em
:
Public Interest and Administration of Transfers
During the early development of the Colorado
Basin, water rights were self-created property rights
established by ar\ appropr iator' s actions to divert
wate^ in accordance with the doctrine of prior
appropriation. The only limitations were that the
water be put to benefice! use, and that existing rights
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could not be injured by the new diversion. As
competition for water increased and unappropriated
water became less available, it became necessary to
develop a system of state administration to oversee
water laws and control the appropriation, adjudication,
transfer and distribution of water rights (Dewsnut and
Jensen 1973, 13-14; Radosevich 1980, £69-270 ; Trelease
1977, 61).
There are two systems used to administer water
rights in the Southwest: the Colorado court system and
the permit system. Oil the basin states, except
Colorado, utilize administrative law under the permit
system. Two criteria by which these institutions can
be compared are: the extent to which they provide
representation of public interests; and their ability
to efficiently administer water right reallocations and
transfers from old to new uses, or to new locations of
diversion and use. These criteria have particular
significance in the Southwest due to increasing water
scarcity and conflicting public and private demands on
water resources.
Colorado Court System
In 1879, Colorado became the first state to
establish an administrative system to oversee the
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doctrine of prior appropriation. This system divides
authority between water courts and the state engineer.
The water courts are responsible for allocation and
adjudication of water rights. The state engineer is
responsible for distribution of water, and
administration of water laws (Radosevich 198iZi,
£69-371). Colorado is the only basin state in which
the establishment of a water right is not controlled by
administrative law. Under the court system, a water
right is still a self-created right, but the priority
of the appropriation is established through
adjudication in the courts.
The process for establishing or transfering a
water right requires the appropriator to file a private
suit which is advertised so that any protesting users
can be heard. The petitioner is required to provide
evidence that there is available water and that there
will be no injury to other rights. fill evidence and
hydrologic data is provided by the contesting parties.
The state engineer and other water related agencies are
generally not involved in the adjudication, and serve
only to keep records of the court's water decrees and
to administer rights once they have been determined
(Hartman and Seastone 1970, 18-19). The only concern
of the court in making reallocation decrees is to
determine availability of water to insure noninjury of
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prior existing rights. There is no provision for the
protection or representation of public interests during
adjudication (Colorado Energy Research Institute 1981,
260-261; White 1977, 118-127; Petros 1985, 4). Public
interests which are unrepresented include: instream
uses for asethetics, wildlife and recreation;
protection of water quality; and economic and social
stability in traditional water use sectors (CERI 1981,
261). The Colorado Energy Research Institute states
that :
Neither is there any existing mechanism for the
public as a whole to indicate its preferences
regarding the value of community-shared water
uses. (1981, 261)
Administrative Permit System
For the other basin states, self-created rights
were replaced with administrative law. Under
administrative law, a water right is granted through a
permit system administered by the state engineer.
Radosevich explains that in 1890, Wyoming was the first
state to recognize the need for more administrative
control over aquisition and transfer of water rights,
and developed the first permit system with public
interest limitations. Unlike the Colorado court
system, the permit system combines all the major
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administrative activities under the authority of the
state engineer, or a natural resources agency (1980,
£69-273). In addition to determining availability of
water and noninjury of existing rights, the
significance of the permit system was that a state now
reviewed the proposed appropriation, or transfer of
water rights, and could deny the permit if it was found
to be contrary to the public interest. Aside from the
general concept of public interest, permits have been
denied as a result of adverse social costs, or lost
opportunity costs ("["release 1980, £0£) .
Applications for establishing, transfering, or
adjudicating a water right are generally made to the
state engineer's office (see Dewsnut and Jensen 1973;
Hartrnan and Seastone 1970, 19-££). Publication of the
request is made to notify other water users, who may
protest the application to the state engineer. The
evidence provided by the applicant and any contesting
parties is evaluated by the engineer and compared to
hydrologic data collected by the state engineer's
office. The state engineer determines if
unappropriated water is available, if existing rights
will be affected, and if the public interest will be
protected. Throughout the process, public interest
values in water are represented by the state engineer's
office, or other state water agencies. The only time
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adjudication reaches the courts is ori appeal of the
engineer's decision.
Administering Hater Transfers
In a study comparing the New Mexico permit system
and the Colorado court system, Hartman and Seastone
(1970, £3-25) found that one of the greatest obstacles
to making efficient transfer decisions to new water
uses is the lack of accurate hydro logic data and
uncertainties in its interpretation (see also Kneese
and Brown 1981, 93). The Colorado court system relies
on case by case surveys of water use which are prepared
by contending parties to support their own interests.
The state engineer is not involved and the court must
develop an understanding of the complex problems
involving interrelated return flows and their affect on
various water users. "The court, without professional
engineering skills, then must make a choice or a
compromise between conflicting sets of engineering
data" (Hartman and Seastone 1970, S4). In addition,
there is no public interest representation (unless it
involves one of the contending parties), or attempt to
make transfers as economically efficient as possible.
The Colorado system only attempts to protect existing
water rights from adverse impacts.
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By comparison, the permit system utilizes
hydrologic data which is cont inuously collected by
competent state agencies. Proposed allocations and
transfers of water rights are evaluated by state
hydrologists, who are better equipped than the courts
to understand and evaluate the complex
interrelationships of various water rights. ' In
addition, the engineers who provide the hydrologic
evaluations represent the public interest, not the
interests of a contending party. fis an administrative
institution, the permit system is more capable of
providing efficient water transfer decisions that are
coordinated with public interest values in water
resources (Hartrnan and Seastone 1970, £3-25).
ft major factor involved with transfering water
rights to new uses, or in changing the location of
diversion and use, is determining the impact on return
flows and third party rights not directly involved in
the transaction. Hartrnan and Seastone state that,
. . . obstacles to transfers do not inhere so much
in existing laws as in the uncertainties
associated with the physical hydrologic system and
the effects accompanying the transact ion C, 3 and
that these uncertainties are effected by the
procedures through which factual evidence is
generated and evaluated. (1970, 15-16)
The permit approach to administering appropriation
rights provides a superior mechanism for reducing
uncertaint ies in evaluating the hydrologic facts
associated with a water right transfer, and arriving at
a decision based on appropriation law and the public
interest. The major difference between the two
administrative institutions is that the court system is
adversarial in nature, from the first step in
establishing a water right, to the final decree. The
permit system is one of negotiated administrative
discretion, based on unbiased information, informed
analysis and statutory law.
Proposed Improvements
White asserts that the major problem associated
with the permit system and the appropriation doctrine
is the prevailing definition of public interest and
beneficial use which is "usually restricted to economic
or utilitarian concerns" (1977, 1£7). He finds that,
while states are beginning to recognize environmental
concerns, the definition needs to be expanded to
include agricultural preservation and other concerns.
Tregarthen, an advocate of a free market in water
rights allocation, acknowledges market failure in
recognizing nonmarket concerns such as openspace
created by cropland preservation. He suggests these
factors can be accounted for by adjusting prices paid
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for agricultural water rights to include this openspace
value (1977, 149).
Improvements could be made to the court system by
providing comprehensive hydrologic data collected by
state agencies to establish present conditions of water
use, and hydrologic relationships between rights. In
addition, representation of public interests could be
provided by establishing sri advocate within the court
system. This could be a private advocate, such as a
conservation group, or it could be a state agency, as
with the permit system. A state agency would provide
more consistant representation and would not be limited
to certain cases. However, the adversarial nature of
the court system is likely to perclude public interest
factors which a^e not directly involved with the case,
no matter which advocate is used (Colorado Energy
Research Institute 1981, £63).
Marcum found that the proposal to transfer
allocation authority from water courts to the state
engineer's office in Colorado was supported by those
who felt the courts lacked technical competence in
making water decrees. In addition, it was felt that
unification of all administrative duties into the state
engineer's office would promote more rational
decisions. Marcum found those opposing the idea
included water lawyers, and agricultural groups who
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felt the district water judge would better represent
their interests. He concluded that such a change in
the Colorado court system was politically unlikely
(1978, 55-56).
The Colorado Energy Research Institute suggests
that Colorado could also use state police powers and
tax authority to promote public interest protection.
Police powers to limit certain less desirable water
uses could be applied to the private water right, or
taxes could be applied to those uses as a disincentive
(1981, E63-E64). Colorado has taken some steps to
improve its system of prior appropriation. The Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 was
passed to improve records of existing water rights and
hydrologic data, and to establish seven water courts
(Petros 1985). In addition, Colorado is one of the
only states which has given statutory authorization to
state agencies to aquire instream water rights through
the market system. Both of these actions may improve
protection of public interests in water alloction.
Flexibility of Transfers
and Duration of Permits
Under the appropr iat ion doctrine water rights are
granted in perpetuity. Trelease suggests this is what
insures the security of a water right and encourages
the necessary long term capital investments in its
diversion and distribution facilities. This also gives
greater security to the specific water use for which a
right is intended. Flexibility in transfering a water
right is accomplished through the market system,
whereby rights are transfered to new higher valued uses
by compensating water losers for the unamortized
portion of the investment. As with rights in land,
flexibility increases with the security of a water
right (1977, 64-66).
Authors opposed to this view suggest that
compensation is rarely provided to third party losers.
Therefore, permits for water rights should be granted
for specified periods of time, after which the state
reevaluates the continued application of water to a
specific use, according to public interest policies and
changing water demands (see Bromley 19812; Rodosevich
I960; and Kelso 1980). This could go as far as having
the state aquire water rights which it then administers
through contract permits. This type of permit would
give the state more control over water management and
allocation to protect against third party
externalities. Flexibility in transfering a right
would be established through periodic evaluation of its
use (Radosevich 1980, EB5-E86)
.
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Implications For Planning
In addition to providing representation of public
policy interests, Trelease (1988, £03) asserts that the
permit system provides a coordinating mechanism for
implementing state water plans. Comprehensive water
plans can establish public interest policies and
identify those water uses which need special
protection, or uses which should be discouraged. The
water plan provides guidelines for the state engineer,
or other water resource agency, which will insure the
allocation of water use permits in accordance with
public interest policies.
Coordinated implementation of a state water plan
would be difficult to achieve in the court system in
Colorado, under which water rights sre more privatized
and remain self created. There is no mechanism for
allocating in accordance with public interest polices
established in a water plan (Sherman 1977). Marcum
(197S, 84-85) found some experts suggest changing the
Colorado court system to a permit system because it
would provide the state with better management of water
use. In addition, the permit system would,
. . . afford a more comprehensive planning
approach to water allocation and use, as well as
allow for an integration of water related factors
into land use and other types of natural resource
planning. (1378, 85)
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The permit system of water right administration is
the dominant inst it utt ion in the western states,
including the Colorado River Basin. Because of its
ability to al locate water according to publ ic interest
guidelines, it is likely to remain as the primary
admininistrat i ve inst i tut ion for al locat ion and
management within a state. As a result of the success
of this institution, it is being utilized by more of
the eastern states, which are also beginning to suffer
water shortages and conflicting uses (Dewsnut and
Jensen 1973)
.
Impediments To Efficient Use and Transfer of Water
fis competition over scarce water resources
i ncreases, t he promot ion of effici ent wat er use,
incent i ves to conserve, and improved transferabi 1 ity to
new higher valued uses becomes more essential. There
A^e a number of character ist ics and emerging trends
associated with the doctrine of prior appropriation
which create impediments to the efficient use, or
transfer of water to new uses.
fin appropriat ion right is defined as a specific
diverted quant ity. This quant ity must be cont inual ly
a pp 1 i ed to a benef icial use, or the owner r i sks
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forfeiture of all or a port ion of his right. This
creates an incentive to divert the entire quantity,
even if it is not needed. The result is wasted water
wh ich could have been appl ied to another use. I
f
states allowed an owner to sell surplus water which he
has conserved, an economic incentive would be created
to encourage more efficient use of water, resulting in
greater conservation efforts (Tregarthen 1983). New
Mexico does permit the sale of conserved water if it
can be metered. However, the high cost of metering has
discouraged corservat ion (Gisser and Johnson 1983,
147) . In add it ion, some authors suggest that
beneficial use and forfeiture 1 imitat ions should be
removed to allow speculative, or anticipatory water
rights (Tregarthen 1983; Williams 1983).
A re 1 at ed prob 1 em concerns ret urn f 1 ows. When a
water right is transfered to a new use or location, the
court or state engineer determines the amount of water
consumed by the previous use and limits the new right
to that amount, and not the quant ity of the original
diversion. This is essent ial to insure cont inued
return flows to downstream rights. However, it creates
uncertainties for the buyer and seller in knowing in
advance how much water cari be transfered, and it
encourages waste by the seller in an effort to maximize
the quant ity consumed. Determining the historic
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consumption of the original user can often be
difficult. In addition, reducing the quantity of the
diverted right to the quantity historically consumed
may limit the incentive to transfer water to higher
valued uses (Tregarthen 1977, 148). Many authorities
suggest that economic efficiency and water conservation
would be improved if water rights were defined in terms
Of consumptive use, and not quantity diverted, for both
original rights and transfered rights (Tregarthen 1983,
136; Gisser and Johnson 1983, 161| Kneese and Brown
1981, 94).
There is a growing trend in the establishment of
impediments to efficient water use and transferability,
arising from legislative or political actions which are
often protectionist in nature. These include
anti-export statutes from one state to another, basin
of origin protections, minimum stream flows, and
statutory preferences for certain uses (see White 1977;
and Trelease 1988). While these limitations often
serve public interests, restrictions on water export
and basin of origin have recently been used by western
and midwestern states to block unpopular interstate
coal—slurry pipelines, or the transfer of agricultural
water from one state to another.
Trelease warns against this pol i t ici zat ion of
water law by legislative bodies. Water management
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decisions made in the public interest should encourage
economic efficiency and consideration of alternative
uses of water. These decisions are best made by state
water agencies, having the technical expertise to
evaluate alternative uses. This results in
administrative decisions based on factual evidence,
which Are limited by statutory standards, instead of
political pressures (1980, £06-212). State water laws
that become too protectionist in nature run the risk of
being found unconstitutional, based on the interstate
commerce clause. These laws invite federal
intervention. "he federal government could allocate
water from federal reservoirs to accommodate these
uses, or it could supersede state appropriation law and
develop a national water law, eliminating state control
over allocation (Trelease 1980, £13).
Many authorities view traditional single-purpose
interstate allocation compacts as impediments to
transfers because these compacts establish specific
apportionments for each state (Kneese and Brown 1981,
93). This problem could be overcome by eliminating
export restrictions by providing for the states to sell
water to other states, using term permits.
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Economic Efficiency arid Preservation:
The Trend Towards Privatization or Public Trust
Kneese and Brown find that many of the impediments
to economically efficient water transfers are
legitimate reflections of the region's public interest
concerns for agricultural and environmental
preservation (1981, 93). This raises the question,
should water allocations and transfers be made in the
most economically efficient manner, or should public
interest limitations be involved ?
Castle states that this is the fundamental issue
in natural resources policy and csrt be characterized by
the problem of balancing market oriented economic
growth with nonmarket environmental preservation (1960,
5). This issue manifests itself in the conflict
between individual decision making and group
decisionmaking (1980, 6). With respect to water
resources, there is definite disagreement over this
issue and the direction water allocation institutions
should follow in the future. This is illustrated by
the following statements:
Water is too valuable a resource not to be left to
profit-seeking firms. (Tregarthen 1983, 135)
Water has been too well recognized as a scarce,
socially important resource belonging to and
controlled by the state to permit a pure market
system as a substitute. (Vlachos and Hendricks
1977, S43)
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Some experts advocate a return to more privatized,
self-created water rights that ars allocated through a
free market system to improve economic efficiency in
water use and transfers (see Tregarthen 1983; Gisser
and Johnson 1983; and Cuzan 1983). They assert that
water laws should be improved to provide clearer
definition and enforcement of private water rights, and
that impediments to transfers in use should be removed.
This would result in an economically efficient free
market, more capable of determining the highest and
best use of water. Allocation decisions would be made
by individual buyers and sellers. Externalities and
third party impacts would be mitigated through
compensat ion.
Those opposed to this approach advocate continued
expansion of state administrative control under the
permit system to protect public interests in water
allocation (see Radosevich 1980; Kelso 1980s and Peak
1977) . They agree that improvements in efficient water
use and increased flexibility in water transfers need
to be made. However, "the most rational economic
approach in water allocation is not necessarily the
most socially desirable" (Vlachos and Hendricks 1977,
85), particularly when it destabilizes the existing
socio-economic structure of the Southwest.
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These authors propose that state water agencies
appropriate remaining water and allocate it according
to state water plans which have identified public
interest priorit ies in water use. 01 locat ion decisions
are based on public trust, utilizing term or contract
permits which can be periodically reviewed. Kelso
suggests states could adopt a more formal public
landlord - private tenant reationship with respect to
water use permits. This would provide: improved
protection of the public resource; security of use for
the leasee; increased flexibility in transfers to new
uses; and imprcved conditions for promoting long range
planning (1980, 891-297)
.
It is interesting to note that authors
representing both sides of the privatization - public
trust issue advocate the establishment of some form of
water brokerage agency to keep records of existing
water rights (quantity and ownership) and hydrologic
data, and to serve as a clearing house of avai lable
rights and proposed transfers (see Kelso 1980;
Radosevich 1980; Howe, Alexander and Moses 198£> . Such
an agency, whether publ ic or private, could faci 1 it ate
more efficient transfer of water to new uses and
provide a forum for buyers and sellers.
Ultimately, the question should not be posed as a
choice between privatization or public trust. Tha best
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solution to the need for increased economic efficiency
and public interest protection in water use is finding
the appropriate mixture of public and private control
over allocation decisions (Castle 19821). This requires
a balance between "economic efficiency and societal
norms of fairness and equity" (Kneese and Brown 1981,
94). The process of determining this appropriate
balance can best be facilitated through comprehensive
land and water planning.
Hater allocation Law Bs R Land Use Tool
It is apparent that water allocation arid
management will significantly affect the future of the
Colorado River Basin. The interstate compact and the
permit system of allocation can both be improved to
accommodate more comprehensive water planning and
management, and could be utilised to coordinate land
and water planning efforts. This raises the question
of using water law as a land use tool for growth
management and land use planning. As with most issues
involving water in the Southwest, there are opposing
views on this issue.
Os discussed above, Trelease sees a trend in the
pol it icizat ion of water law by the states, which is the
result of protectionist reactions to unwanted land
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uses. He asserts that water law is an inappropriate
tool for accomplishing land use control, and that
"distorting water law into a land use regulating tool"
(1980, £12) threatens its integrity as an efficient
allocation tool for water. Restrictive water laws, by
themselves, will not achieve the desired land use
control. He suggests the use of sound comprehensive
land use planning, utilizing growth management
techniques, zoning and environmental controls to
determine the desired land use activities. Water law
should then be used to allocate according to the
established public interest d^Btf, £12-217).
Marcum found that most experts opposed the
utilization of water management as a tool for land use
planning or growth management in Colorado, the only
basin state still utlilizing self created water rights.
Opposition was based on the fear that this would
undermine the private ownership of water rights (197S,
62, 75)
.
Generally, those who advocate stronger state
control over water allocation, in conformance with
identified public interests, also see water law as an
effective tool for land use control. In addition, they
see the importance of integrating and coordinating
state land and water" planning so that water allocation
will not conflict with growth management policies (see
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Lamm 1977, ££0; Sherman 1977, 2£6~2£9; Castle 1980, 10).
Some author it ies propose that water be zoned for
certain uses, just as land is zoned (Marc urn 1978, 81 ) .
Th i s proposal cou 1 d prove difficult to accomp 1 i sh d ue
to the transient nature of water, and because in the
Southwest , it i s a 1 i ena t ed from the 1 and . V 1 achos and
Hendricks suggest that,
. . . it seems possible that natural resources
policies can utilize water as a major means for
either controlling or, if wanted, stimulating
growth. . . . Around water as an organizing
concept the broader policies of development c&Vi be
interwoven into an integrated effort for managing
growth in ^ri ecologically fragile region. (1977,
£42)
It may be more appropriate to consider this
controversy in terms of finding the social ly acceptable
balance between keeping water law as a pure institution
for defining, enforcing and transferring private
property ri ghts, and utilizing it as a less passive
tool for land use planning. Water law could be a very
ef fect i ve t oo 1 for 1 sirtd use cont ro 1 , if used i
n
conjunction with comprehensive land planning. No
matter what balance is established, it is clear that
water law should be coordinated with land planning to
achieve comprehensive management in the Colorado River
Basin.
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSION
The Colorado River Basin arid the allocation of its
water resources will play a significant role in the
future of the southwestern United States and the nation
as a whole. The management issues discussed in Chapter
One are all important, however it appears that two of
these issues will have more long term impact on the
region and its water.
The first is the quantification of federal and
Indian reserved rights associated with the large
percentage of public lands in the region. The courts
have established an implied right of sufficient
quantity to serve the needs of the land reservation.
If this is interpreted to include all potential uses of
the land, there could be significant quantities of
water transfered out of private ownership, resulting in
increased competition over water and loss of economic
activities and jobs. One solution to this problem
would be the leasing of federal or Indian water to
existing private users so that economic activities
would be less disrupted. Quantification of reserved
rights should be completed as soon as possible to
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remove uncertairities over available water and to
faci 1 it ate a more accurate evaluat ion of its impacts on
the region through the piannning process.
The second issue involves the development and
transformation of the mostly rural, agricultural
Southwest into art urban industrial region. The
transfer of agricult ural water and 1 and to other uses,
such as energy development which may be more transient
or short term, could destabi 1 ize the long term
socio-economic fabric of the region. Once this
underlying infrastructure is removed, it may be
difficult to guard against the boom and bust cycle
which has characterized the region in the past.
Comprehensive land use planning, coordinated with
agricultural preservation and water law, could help
retain a portion of the traditional socio-economic
structure while accommodating new land and water uses.
Changes should be made in water laws to recognize
nonrnarket instream uses and min i mum st ream f 1 ows as a
beneficial use, to help preserve environmentally
sens it ive or- aesthet ical ly valuable areas which
characterize much of the region.
The nexus between the interrelated planning and
management issues di sussed in Chapter One, and the
problem of allocating increasingly scarce water
resources arnoung cornpet ing uses, is the need for a
109
comprehensive approach towards coordinating water and
land use planning in the basin. Federal, state &rid
local goverments have not established basin-wide
policies, or institutions specifically aimed at
coordinating land and water use activities in the
Southwest
.
Although the permit system of prior appropriation
and the interstate water compact are old institutions,
established during a time of unlimited land
development, it appears that these institutions could
be adapted to facilitate comprehensive resource
planning and growth management. The federal-interstate
compact cari be utilised as a framework for coordinated
interstate resource planning. The permit system of
water allocation can be coordinated with state and
local land use planning to achieve coordinated
implementation of land and water planning within a
state.
The two major interstate compacts in the Colorado
Basin are presently limited to allocating water between
states and the promotion of agricultural and industrial
development. However, new federal-interstate compacts
could be negotiated with expanded multipurpose
objectives that specifically address coordinated
comprehensive resource planning between the states and
the federal government. R major obstacle to achieving
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ari effective multipurpose planning compact will be the
state's reluctance to delegate greater planning and
decision making authority to an interstate commission.
In addition, there is the historic rivalry between the
states and the federal government over the control of
resources in the basin, and the recent trend towards
federal decentralization. This may make the states
hesitant about giving the federal government an equal
voice on interstate resource planning commissions.
Because of the large tracts of public lands in the
Colorado River Basin, it is important that the states
include the fecieral government in this type of
interstate planning effort. The federal-interstate
compact has a strong legal foundation in the United
States Constitution and is strengthened by the
requirement of Congressional approval. The signatory
parties, including the federal government, are bound to
the compact provisions by law. The courts have found
that compact provisions are superior to state law.
This should make it a good foundation on which to base
interstate comprehensive planning.
Water resource planning is undergoing a transition
from development and diversion of water to management
and allocation of scarce water among competing uses.
It appears that water allocation policy is also at a
turning point. There is strong support for a return to
Ill
more pr i vat ized market oriented water rights which
emphasise economical ly efficient al locat ion and
transfers. This approach may be current ly popular
because it reflects the policies of the Reagan
administration. The alternative is one in which water
rights are al located and transferee! by state agencies
according to economic efficiency, but with the
inclusion of public interest limitations. Given the
desire for coordinated land and water planning, the
ermit system of water allocation has been shown to be
superior to the- privatized Colorado court system. The
national trend is towards the permit approach as
competition over scarce water increases.
No matter which alternat i ve future is f ol lowed,
there are a number of improvements that car\ be made to
increase the efficiency of existing institutions iri
establishing original rights, transferring water to nevs
uses, and for providing better incentives for water
conservat ion in the Southwest. The most important
improvement is to measure water rights by the quantity
consumed, not the quantity diverted, and to allow an
owner to sell unused or conserved portions of a right.
Other improvements include the removal of basin of
origin restrict ions and restrict ions on water export,
as long as there is provision for the protection of
public trust by utilizing the permit system.
112
The most difficult question to answer will be the
extent to which water laws should be used as a direct
growth management tool. It is important to keep in
mind that water laws ar^e intended to provide clear
definition, enforcement and security of a private
usufructuary right, so that an owner is assured of
continued future use and protection of investments. In
addition, water laws should facilitate economically
efficient transfers and use of water. However, water
.has been declared to be the property of the public and
its allocation should follow the public interest
policies established through the process of land and
water planning. It is clear that water law should not
be used by itself, or in place of comprehesive planning
to address the land and water issues facing the
Southwest. Effective comprehensive planning requires
that water allocation policies not conflict with growth
management policies. This may require water laws to be
integrated into the comprehensive planning and
implementation process, and it may require some
limitations on strict economic efficiency. Ultimately,
the public must decide the extent to which water laws
are used as a planning tool, as well as the balance
between economic efficiency and socially acceptable
norms of fairness and equity in water allocation. Os
demands on water resources in the Colorado River Basin
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increase, efforts should be made to incl ude greater
levels of demand oriented management in the planning
process. This is a logical extension of water
planning' s transition from developing new supplies to
managing existing supplies.
The authority to allocate water rights rests with
the states for all water except federal and 1 Indian
reserved rights, and navigable waters. It appears that
while this authority is based on the premise that
federal land acts transfered this authority from the
federal government to the states, the authority
actual ly comes from the inact ion of the federal
government to enact legislation superseding state laws.
Unless states enact overly restrict i ve water laws which
burden interstate commerce, it is likely that this
authority will remain with the states. This should
facilitate implementation of more comprehensive state
land and water planning.
The intent of this Master' s Report was to provide
a general understanding of the issues surrounding water
resource allocation in the Colorado River Basin by
examining: planning arid management issues; exisiting
legal institutions for water rights and allocation; as
well as the problems and emerging trends in these
institutions and their implications on future planning.
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Future research should concentrate on the following
topics
:
1. Procedures for establishing greater public
participation in the planning process,
particularly as it relates to state and interstate
resource planning.
£. Procedures for facilitating greater levels of
state land use planning and growth management.
State level water planning is generally accepted
in most states, however land use planning has, for
the most part, remained at the local level.
3. Agriculture is the largest user of water in the
Southwest, for both diversion and consumption.
Improvements to increase the efficiency of
irrigation and diversion practices should be
explored. Any increases in efficiency would free
more water for ot her uses.
4. Studies need to be made to establ ish
procedures for reducing the t ime it takes to
rat ify interstate compacts at the state and
federa 1 1 eve 1 . In add i t i on, proceed '.ires need t o be
found which will facilitate states in delegating
greater powers to interstate compact commissions,
i f these compacts are to be used for comprehens i ve
resource planning.
APPENDIX ft
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TABLE 3. WATER BUDGET: UPPER COLORADO BASIN
1975 1985 2000
Category
lMF SRF IF SRF NF SRF
VOLUMETRIC DATA (mgd)
-Base conditions-
Total streamflow 12 ,44 NE 12 ,440 NE 12,440 NE
Streamflow at outflow
point(s) 10 ,000 10 ,077 9 ,232 8 ,875 8,901 8,153
Fresh-water withdrawals 6 ,869 7 ,949 7 ,841 9 ,505 7,519 8,795
Agr 1 culture 6 ,427 7 ,639 7 ,254 8 ,809 6,706 7,580
Steam electric 103 53 157 172 201 248
Manufacturing 4 <1 2 <1 2 <1
Domestic 70 105 76 159 S3 201
Commerc i a 1 to a 10 a 11 a
Minera Is 132 120 195 304 355 698
Publ ic lands 103 32 120 61 127 68
Fish hatcheries 20 NE 27 NE 34 NE
Other NE NE NE
Fresh-water consumption 2 ,440 2 ,118 3 ,018 2 ,890 3,232 3,419
Agriculture 2 ,221 1 ,956 2 ,688 2 ,479 2,775 2,668
Steam electric 39 50 106 164 151 241
Manufacturing 2 <1 1 <1 2 <\
Domestic 25 39 27 58 29 74
Commerc i a 1 3 a 4 a 4 a
Minerals 47 45 72 137 144 376
Publ ic lands 103 27 120 52 127 60
Fish hatcheries NE NE NE
Other NE NE NE
Ground-water withdrawals 126 105 NE 105 NE 105
Exports 803 635 985 366 1,095 1,059
Evaporation 711 662 721 860 728 860
l-nstream approximation
F ish and wl Idl i fe 7 ,947 7 ,947 7,947
Treaties and compacts 6 ,700 6 ,698 6 ,700 6 ,698 6,700 6,698
NE - Not estimated.
3 SRF domestic water use includes commercial and institutional requirements.
NF - National Future Estimates
SRF - State & Regional Future Estimates
Source: U.S. Water Resources Council (1978b., 17).
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TABLE 4. WATER BUDGET: LOWER COLORADO BASIN
Category
VOLUMETRIC DATA (mgd)
-Base conditions-
Tota I streamf I ow
Streamflow at outflow
pointts)
Fresh-water withdrawals
Agriculture
Steam electric
Manufacturing
Domest i c
Commerc i a I
Minerals
Publ ic lands
Fish hatcheries
Other
Fresh-water consumption
Agricul ture
Steam electric
Manuf actur ing
Domest i c
Commercial
Minerals
Publ ic lands
Fish hatcheries
Other
Ground-water withdrawals
Exports
Evaporation
Instream approximation
Fish and wi Idl ife
1,550 1,340° -f,544 1,340°
8,917 7,962 8 ,528 8 ,922 7 ,857 8,882
8,036 6,955 7 ,351 6 ,838 6 ,403 6,635
68 56 150 167 154 267
89 124 92 192 138 247
423 580 520 87? 658 1,110
75 92 114 D
184 156 252 281 311 4 56
20 23 49 57 56 65
22 NE 22 NE 23 NE
68 108 122
4,595 4,891 4 ,754 5 ,268 4 ,708 5,556
4,073 4,229 4 ,014 4 ,161 3 ,780 4,062
63 53 134 162 126 250
55 63 54 94 104 123
199 3
'b
245 44g 310 544
35 43 54 b
151 142 217 262 280 412
19 23 47 56 54 . 65
NE ME NE
64 95 100
5,008 4,324 NE 2 ,447 NE 3,609
4,498 4,465 4 ,129 3 ,929 4 ,032 3,929
1,202 1,230 1 ,222 1 ,232 t ,236 1,240
6,864 6,864
NE - Not estimated.
3 SRF streamflow is the minimum flow required by the Mexican Water Treaty.
SRF domestic water use includes commercial and Institutional requirements.
NF - National Future Estimates
SRF - State & Regional Future Estimates
Source: U.S. Water Resources Council (1978a. 20).
118
NOTES: Chapter 1
1. Wayne Asp mail, Congressman from Colorado from 1949
to 1972, was chairman of the House Interior arid
Insular Affairs Committee. Morris Udall,
Congressman from Arizona, succeeded Aspinall as
chairman.
£. The SageDrush Rebellion is the name given to various
actions taken by Western states in recent years in
their attempt to gain control over federal lands and
natural resources tnat lie within their borders.
3. Off-st ream uses require the diversion of water away
from the river to the location of use.
4. While salinity is the major water quality problem in
the Colorado Basin, other problems such as turbidity
Bre also significant.
5. Beneficial use is a term used by the courts and
within water- law, which generally means any use of
water that creates sri economic benefit.
NOTES: Chapter £
1. A usufruct is the legal right of using, enjoying and
profiting from something not owned by the person
holding the usufruct.
£. Appurtenance is " an incidental right attached to a
principal property right and passing in possession
with it" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1979,
56).
3. Excerpt with deletions from Trelease (1974, 3£).
4. The doctrine of equitable apportionment is based on
the premise that every state has equal rights and
standing with respect to every other state.
5. Excerpt from Trelease (1974, 668).
6. Excerpt with deletions from Trelease (1974, 666).
7. Excerpt from Trelease (1974, 675).
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ABSTRACT
The Southwestern region of the United States is
undergoing rapid growth and transformation from a
most ly rural, agricultural ly based region into one
which is becoming more urbanized and dependent on
manufacturing, industry and energy development. Due to
the arid environment, this region has been heavi ly
dependent on the waters of the Colorado River Basin. A
system of legal institutions was established early in
the region to facilitate development and diversion of
water; however, they did not specifically account for
reallocation and transfer to new uses, once all the
water had been appropriated. It is now recognized that
the Colorado Basin' s water is fully al located, and
water management is undergoing a transit ion from water
development, to management and allocation of existing
supplies amoung competing uses.
The significance of the Colorado River Basin to
the Southwest and the nation is examined, as well as
management and planning issues surrounding allocation
of water resources. Issues examined include; pol it ical
influence of states; federal v. state management ; the
energy crisis; growth of the sunbelt ; balancing
development and preservation; water quantity, quality
and use; publ ic interest and pri vat izat ion; and
coordinated land and water planning. The existing
legal inst itut ions control ling water rights and
allocation are examined, concentrating on the doctine
of prior appropriation and the interstate compact. The
legal basis and case law surrounding the development
and interpretation of these inst itut ions is discussed.
Finally, the problems, recommendations and emerging
trends in these institutions &re examined, as well as
their implications on future planning and management in
the basin.
It was found that the Colorado River Basin and the
allocation of its water resources will play a
significant role in the future of the Southwest and the
nation. Important issues facing the basin include
quantification of federal and Indian reserved water
rights which are tied to the large tracts of public
domain and Indian lands within the basin. These rights
could transfer large quantities of water away from
exist ing private rights. Development and transfer of
rural agricultural lands and water to urban- industrial
transient uses, such as energy development, could
destabilize the traditional long term socio-economic
st ruct Lire of t he So ut hwest res u 1 1 i ng in a renewed boom
and bust cycle. This impact ca.ri be mitigated through
comprehensive planning, coordinated with agricultural
land preservation and water laws.
The nexus between resource management issues
facing the basin and the problem of al locat ing scarce
water resources amoung compet ing uses is the need for a
comprehensive approach towards coordinating water and
land use planning. It was found that the
federa 1 - 1 nt erst at e compact could prov i d e a framework
for coord i nat ed i nt erst at e reso urce p 1 ar^i ing.
Interstate compacts have a strong legal foundat ion in
the United States Const it ut ion and are required to have
Congressional approval. Signatory parties and the
federal government are bound to compact provisions,
which are superior to state law, making the institution
a good foundation for interstate planning. The permit
system of water allocation was found to be capable of
prov id ing a coord i nat ing mechanism for impl ement ing
land and water planning within a state, and is superior
to the Colorado court system for this purpose. Water
allocation policies are at a juncture in which water-
rights could become more privatized to promote economic
efficiency in use and water transfers, or water rights
could follow the national trend towards utilizing the
permit system to include public interest 1 irnitat ions in
al locat ion and transfer decisions.
Improvements cart be made to existing institutions
to increase efficiency in water use, conservation,
allocation, and transfers to new uses. These include:
allowing the sale of unused portions of water rights;
removal of the requirement to divert water; measuring
original and transferee! ri ghts in quant ity consumed
;
and removal of export and basin of origin restrict ions.
Water law is inappropriate as a growth management tool
if used by itsel f , but it could be effect i ve if
coordinated with comprehensive land use planning.
Ultimately the public will have to determine the
appropriate balance between economic efficiency, and
soc i a 1 1 y accept ab 1 e 1 eve Is of fa imess and eq u i t y in
water al locat iori decisions. Compet it ion over scarce:
wat er in the bas i n req u i res great er 1 eve Is of demand
oriented management and planning. State authority to
allocate water is likely to continue, unless states
enact restrict i ve laws which conf 1 ict with the
interstate commerce clause. State authority in water
allocation should facilitate comprehensive land and
water planning. Research is needed in: establishing
st at e 1 eve 1 resource p 1 ann i ng ; more ef f i c i ent
irrigation and water diversion to promote conservation;
public participation in resource planning; and
procedures to faci 1 itate use of interstate compacts for
comprehensive resource planning.
